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Righting Victim Wrongs: Responding to




The innocent victim, the disempowered victim, the
saintly victim, the humble victim, the heart-broken victim,
the abused victim, the angry victim, the wrathful victim-
all these images resonate strongly in the recent narrative of
criminology. Less resonant are images of the wrongful vic-
tim, the abusive victim, the careless victim, and the reck-
less victim. Equally stark is the portrayal of victim blam-
ing. Popular imaging and ideology relegate victim blaming
to the province of morally bankrupt defense attorneys and
misogynists. For instance, many feel that only the most
strategic defense attorneys and the most chauvinist tradi-
tionalists blame women for domestic violence and rape.'
t Assistant Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law,
J.D. Harvard Law School magna cum laude, B.A., U.C. Berkeley summa cum
laude, Assistant Public Defender, Washington D.C., Assistant Federal
Defender, S.D. Fla. I am grateful to Duncan Kennedy, Jorge Esquirol, and Mark
Tunick for helping me develop ideas for this piece. I also thank the editorial
staff of the Buffalo Law Review, in particular Nicole Hart, for an efficient edit.
1. Cheryl Hanna, for example, argues:
"Blaming the victim" is a common theme in criminal practice. Defense
attorneys and accused batterers routinely argue that the woman knew
what buttons to push to make the accused hit her. Perhaps she
provoked him by starting the argument. Maybe she failed to do her
duties around the home, to give the accused batterer money, to buy
diapers, or to stop the baby from crying. The power of these arguments
rests on the false assumption that the woman is ultimately able to
control and stop the violence.
Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1882 n.148 (1995-1996); see also
Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Drugs: A Statutory Overview and Proposals for
Reform, 44 ARiz. L. REv. 131, 194 (2002) ("The notion of blaming the victim be-
cause of her conduct in precipitating a sexual crime is particularly problematic
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Those who blame victims for crime exhibit ultimate lack
of humanity.2 Members of society with correct moral com-
portment tend to view victims as beyond reproach or doubt.3
This aversion to victim blaming transpires largely on an
emotional level. Much like questioning the Iraq war at its
inception could occur only at the risk of being characterized
as anti-soldier and unpatriotic,4 the questioning of crime
victims can occur only at the risk of being characterized as
heartless or unethical. The crime victim, just as the Ameri-
can soldier abroad, captures the moral imagination of our
country, engenders reverence, provides a rallying point, al-
lows us to dissociate from the undesirable parts of life, and
in doing so become more moral ourselves.5
in light of the history of similar abuses in rape law."); Jerry von Talge,
Victimization Dynamics: The Psycho-Social and Legal Implications of Family
Violence Directed Toward Woman and the Impact on Child Witnesses, 27 W. ST.
U. L. REV. 111, 131 (2000) ("Similar to a woman being blamed for being a rape
victim ('she asked for it') and a woman being blamed for sexual harassment
('she invited it,' or, 'she went along with it'), the battered woman is frequently
blamed for domestic violence because she stayed in the battering relationship.").
2. Political rhetoric often captures this sense of disgust for victim blaming.
For example, in the 2002 campaign for attorney general of Florida between
Charlie Crist and Buddy Dyer, the Crist campaign ran an outraged television
advertisement claiming that Dyer wanted to allow criminals to sue innocent
victims. Joe Follick, Crist, Dyer Haven't Played Nice in Battle for Office, TAMPA
TRIB., Nov. 1, 2002, at 4.
3. Martha Minow observes:
There is a strong tendency for people to couple a claim of victimhood
with a claim of incorrigibility-that the victim knows better than
anyone else about the victimization, and indeed the victim cannot be
wrong about it .... This may reflect an almost religious view of
suffering, empowering those who suffer with at least respect and
perhaps reverence from others.
Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1411, 1434 (1992-
1993) (footnotes omitted).
4. On March 10, 2003, Natalie Maines, singer for the country band Dixie
Chicks, remarked to a London audience, "Just so you know, we're ashamed the
president of the United States is from Texas." The negative response in the
United States was overwhelming. The South Carolina House of
Representatives, for example, promptly passed a Resolution condemning the
Chicks for their "un-patriotic and unnecessary comments." Karen Addy, House
Passes Resolution Condemning Dixie Chicks for Anti-Bush Remarks, HERALD
ONLINE (March 20, 2003), at http://www.heraldonline.com/iraq/story/2353354p-
2197233c.html.
5. Markus Dubber states:
The identification with the victim at the expense of identifying with the
offender provides an additional benefit to the onlooker, which may well
have contributed to the success of the victims' rights movement. By
denying any similarities with the offender upon which identification
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Positive victim imaging is largely a product of the po-
litically powerful victims' rights movement' and is closely
intertwined with negative defendant characterizations7 and
tough-on-crime politics.8 Victimhood narratives are at once
both a cause and effect of increasing tough-on-crime senti-
ments. Victims' rights provisions often lead directly or
indirectly to harsher sentences and decreased defendant
protections,9 and the narrative of victims' rights serves as a
could be based, the onlooker transforms the essentially ethical question
of punishment into one of nuisance control. An ethical judgment is no
longer necessary .... Once the offender is excluded from the realm of
identification, the question 'how could someone like us (or, stronger,
like me) have done something like this' no longer arises.
Markus Dirk Dubber, The Victim in American Penal Law: A Systematic
Overview, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 3, 9 (1999-2000).
6. Markus Dubber observes that the victims' rights movement "began as
and always remained a political movement, fueled by grassroots campaigns of
concerned citizens backed by politicians eager to outdo their opponents in the
tough-on-crime competition ..... Id. at 6.
7. Martha Minow observes:
Talk of victims seems to divide the world into only two categories:
victims and victimizers. No one wants to be a victimizer, so potential
victimizers try to recast themselves as victims. It becomes a world of
only two identities, which essentially reduce to one characteristic, that
of the helpless victim.
Minow, supra note 3, at 1433 (footnote omitted).
8. Lynne Henderson comments:
Recent victims' rights proposals appear to be driven more by the
retaliatory view of retribution than by the moral aspect of retribution.
The victim who participates in sentencing might further the ends of the
retribution-as-vengeance theory by providing specific and graphic
information about the crime- information that will provoke outrage.
Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 994
(1984-1985).
9. According to experts:
"Victims' rights" were-and are-used to counter "defendants' rights"
and to trump those rights if possible. In an argument that traces back
to at least the early 20"' Century, people accused of crimes are probably
"guilty as sin" and undeserving of so much legal protection. The
argument continues that the constitution of a state, or of the United
States, contains specific rights protecting those accused of crimes (and,
in the case of habeas corpus and cruel and unusual punishments, those
convicted of crimes). Victims of crimes, on the other hand, are
blameless innocents far more "deserving" of rights, and they have
absolutely no constitutional rights.... One fallacy in that argument
immediately appears: Victims, as citizens, have many constitutional
rights, regardless of the specific protections for defendants.
Lynne Henderson, Co-opting Compassion: The Federal Victim's Rights
Amendment, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 579, 582-83 (1997-1998) (footnotes omitted).
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rhetorical tool to justify and moralize the seemingly venge-
ful retributivist trend in criminal law.1" For this reason,
"harmed and humble"1 victims are characterized as venge-
ful rather than forgiving, angry rather than merciful. Like
the tough-on-crime movement, the victims' rights move-
ment has grown into a major socio-political force in the
criminal system." Victims have been put in the forefront,
propelling the once-exclusively public area of criminal law
inexorably toward privatization.
Victims play a major role throughout the criminal proc-
ess, from the inception of the investigation to the decision to
parole inmates from jail.15 This has caused the once-clear
line between the very public nature of criminal law and
10. See Dubber, supra note 5, at 6 ("Certainly in practice, if not in theory,
retributivism quickly gave way to its consequentialist analogue, vengeance, and
the crudest form of consequentialist penology, incapacitation. The rise of the so-
called victims' rights movement in the United States formed an important part
of this consequentialist (re)turn.").
11. George Fletcher advocates a penal theory in which "[tihe imperative of
punishing the guilty springs not from our personal duties to high ideals but
from our relationships with the humbled victims in our midst." GEORGE P.
FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 7
(1995).
12. Elizabeth Joh remarks:
[N]either the victims' rights community nor the Supreme Court
generates or tolerates narratives in which victims' families can exercise
mercy, kindness, or forgiveness towards defendants .... From the
perspective of victimhood, the concept of mercy does not square with
conceptions of helplessness and rage.
Elizabeth E. Joh, Narrating Pain: The Problem With Victim Impact Statements,
10 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 17, 28 (2000-2001).
13. Jonathan Simon comments on the social importance of the victims'
rights movement:
Victims' rights has emerged over the past 25 years as one of the most
important social movements of our time, comparable in its influence on
our political culture to the civil rights movement or feminism. In part
because of the enormous appeal of victimization to television media,
the victims' rights movement has been able to make visible a whole
host of criminal justice decisions that until recently were made with
little attention to public justification.
Jonathan Simon, Megan's Law: Crime and Democracy in Late Modern America,
25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1111, 1136 (2000).
14. See Aya Gruber, Victim Wrongs: The Case for a General Criminal
Defense Based on Wrongful Victim Behavior in an Era of Victims' Rights, 76
TEMPLE L. REV. 645, 649 n.18 (2004) ('The term 'privatization' in this article is
meant specifically to describe the investment of prosecutorial powers, tradition-
ally placed entirely in the hands of the government, in the private victim.").
15. See id. at Part I for a discussion of the prominence of the victim in
criminal prosecutions.
2004] RIGHTING VICTIM WRONGS 437
very private nature of tort law to become blurred. Increas-
ingly, victims play direct roles in the disposition of criminal
cases, and their participation often is the difference be-
tween enforcement of criminal sanctions and non-enforce-
ment.16 The crime victim's role in criminal cases now more
than ever resembles a tort plaintiffs role in civil litigation.
Unlike tort law, however, modern criminal law is
intensely one-sided in its treatment of victims and defen-
dants. Crime victims and criminal defendants do not enter
the trial process on an equal moral footing, as civil litigants
arguably do. Rather, from the beginning victims are as-
sumed blameless, truthful, and even beyond doubt.'7 Con-
versely, defendants are considered guilty, not worthy of
credence, and immoral. 8 The designated victim of the
criminal trial statutorily deserves victims' rights under vic-
tims' bills of rights before any determination of guilt on the
part of the defendant or, in some cases, any determination
that a crime has even occurred. 9 The veracity of the victim,
16. See Geoffrey Hazard, Criminal Justice System: Overview, 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA CRIMINAL JUSTICE 450 (1983), reprinted in JOHN KAPLAN ET AL.,
CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (4th ed. 2000) ("Still another factor [in
charging decisions] is the attitude of the victim. Victim attitude influences the
availability of evidence, obviously so where a conviction can be obtained only if
the victim will testify. But beyond this, the fact that the victim wants prosecu-
tion is morally and politically influential .. ").
17. See Minow, supra note 3, at 1434 ("Especially where feelings of hurt are
involved, victims assert authority on the basis of their experience and treat
statements of that experience as conclusive and the end of discussion.").
18. The presumption of dishonesty is made explicit to juries presiding over
criminal cases in which defendants testify. Judges routinely instruct jurors as
to the lack of credibility of testifying defendants. See, e.g., 5 DAVID M. BORDEN &
LEONARD ORLAND, CONNECTICUT PRACTICE SERIES: CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS
§ 3.8 (3d ed. 2001):
You will consider the importance to [the defendant] of the outcome of
the trial. An accused person, having taken the witness stand, stands
before you, then, just like any other witness and is entitled to the same
consideration and must have his testimony measured in the same way
as any other witness, including his interest in the verdict which you
are about to render.
19. Victims' rights legislation generally does not distinguish between
alleged victims and victims as proven after a criminal disposition. See, e.g.,
ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1 (Victims' Bill of Rights):
(A) To preserve and protect victims' rights to justice and due process, a
victim of crime has a right:
1. To be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity, and to be free
from intimidation, harassment, or abuse, throughout the criminal
justice process.
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and by negative implication the dishonesty of the defen-
dant, is thus assumed prima facie.
Moreover, victims can control dispositions, even when
contrary to the wishes of the prosecution. Experts remark:
Victims no longer are relegated to minor roles in the process: they
are taking center stage in the courtroom, dramatically altering
how justice is achieved. The aim of the victims' rights movement
has been to give victims a "voice" in the process. But this
understandably impassioned voice may drown out less popular
20
calls for fairness and an objective search for truth.
The empowering of victims to this degree is justified in
large part by the narrative of victimhood, mentioned above,
which characterizes victims in a unilateral way. Victims are
considered ultimately blameless, worthy of special rights,
and trustworthy not to abuse those rights.
This one-sided view of victims, however, is a fiction. As
any other people, victims differ in their characteristics.
Martha Minow observes:
[Elveryone I know actually negotiates [different] identities-
navigating between assigned images and inner feelings, new and
2. To be informed, upon request, when the accused or convicted
person is released from custody or has escaped.
3. To be present at and, upon request, to be informed of all criminal
proceedings where the defendant has the right to be present.
4. To be heard at any proceeding involving a post-arrest release
decision, a negotiated plea, and sentencing.
5. To refuse an interview, deposition, or other discovery request by
the defendant, the defendant's attorney, or other person acting on
behalf of the defendant.
6. To confer with the prosecution, after the crime against the victim
has been charged, before trial or before any disposition of the case
and to be informed of the disposition.
Although the "rights" listed above are all conferred at the pre-trial or trial
stage, the Arizona Constitution's treatment of the victim assumes that a crimi-
nal offense has in fact occurred and the victim has been properly identified.
Even though the provisions empowering the victim plainly have effect prior to a
finding of guilt, the Constitution nonetheless defines "victim" as "a person
against whom the criminal offense has been committed or, if the person is killed
or incapacitated, the person's spouse, parent, child or other lawful
representative . . . ." Id. at § 2.1(C). Most U.S. states have passed similar
Victims' Bills of Rights. See, e.g., OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 34; S.C. CONST. art. I, §
24; TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 35; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28.
20. Alice Koskela, Victim's Rights Amendments: An Irresistible Political
Force Transforms the Criminal Justice System, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 157, 163
(1997).
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old contexts, experiences, and ideals. Yet this complexity is denied
by the cramped view of identity. This complexity is denied by the
notion of victimization that confines those who invoke it and seals
21the confinement with the promise of absolution and support.
Some victims are indeed trustworthy, truthful, blame-
less and ultimately innocent. Others, however, are bad
actors themselves, have memory failures, falsely identify,
provoke, and even lie. Some victims are in fact, and indeed
encouraged by society to be, vengeful." Other victims, how-
ever, advocate mercy and forgiveness as part of the process
of "closure, 2' a process to which prosecutors and victim ad-
vocates often allude in justifying particularly severe pun-
ishments like the death penalty. Yet quite clearly, the
complexity and diversity of victims characteristics is not
emphasized by the victims' rights movement or those advo-
cating tough-on-crime policies.25
Because the victims' rights movement embraces the
one-sided characterization of victims as faultless, the in-
creased presence of the victim in the criminal trial does not
coincide with an increased scrutiny of wrongful victim be-
havior." In fact, criminal law is devoid of many of the for-
21. Minow, supra note 3, at 1434 (footnote omitted).
22. Lynne Henderson observes:
"True" victims must remain always innocent and righteously angry at
the same time. The rhetoric and images of victims' rights proponents
ignore the effects of violence on the victims themselves, and those
effects include victims becoming perpetrators as a result of their
experiences.
Henderson, supra note 9, at 587.
23. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 8, at 998 ("Forgiveness alone retains the
uncontested authorship essential to responsibility and resolution. Forgiveness,
rather than vengeance may, therefore, be the act that eventually frees the vic-
tim from the event, the means by which the victim may put the experience be-
hind her.").
24. In Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), the Supreme Court ruled
that the introduction of victim impact evidence at the sentencing phase of a
death penalty case did not violate the Eighth Amendment. O'Connor's concur-
rence emphasizes the need for victim closure:
"Murder is the ultimate act of depersonalization." It transforms a living
person with hopes, dreams, and fears into a corpse, thereby taking
away all that is special and unique about the person. The Constitution
does not preclude a State from deciding to give some of that back.
Id. at 832 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae Justice For
All Political Committee et al. at 3).
25. See Minow, supra note 3, at 1433.
26. See Gruber, supra note 14, at 660:
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mal legal mechanisms contained in tort law that address
the complex nature of victims' contributions to injurious
transactions. There are, however, existing criminal law doc-
trines that do in fact assess liability to victims," although
they are often framed in terms of negating defendant mens
rea rather than lessening liability due to the wrongful
behavior of the victim. 8 Defenses like self-defense, provoca-
tion, defense of others, and defense of property, for example,
lessen defendant liability or exculpate defendants based on
wrongful victim behavior in very specific sets of circum-
stances.29 There are no defenses, however, that exculpate or
mitigate punishment more generally, that is, based on a va-
riety of victim behaviors in a variety of criminal situations.3
[Ilt is clear that the victim's feelings, actions, characteristics, wishes,
and even employment are now acceptable, even desirable, focal points
in a criminal case. The focus on the victim, however, for the most part,
serves the function of generally increasing liability and punishment for
defendants. The trend toward inserting the victim into the culpability
calculus clearly does not include scrutiny of victim behavior as a means
to lessen liability or punishment for defendants.
27. The doctrines of provocation, self-defense, defense of others, and defense
of property are all based, at least in part, on the fact that the victim did
something wrongful or provoking. Victim blaming also enters the criminal case
on an ad hoc basis as decisions not to prosecute, offers of favorable plea agree-
ments, jury nullification, or more formally at sentencing. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. §
5K2.10 (West 1996) (Federal Sentencing Guidelines) (providing for downward
departure where victim provokes defendant's criminal behavior).
28. For example, the provocation doctrine is often framed as negating the
defendant's intent for the crime rather than assessing culpability for the defen-
dant's intentional act in light of the victim's wrongful behavior. See Gruber,
supra note 14, at 672-77 (discussing provocation law and mens rea).
29. See, e.g., U.S. v. Martinez, 988 F.2d 685 (7th Cir. 1993) (provocation);
Starkey v. Dameron, 21 P.2d 1112 (Colo. 1933) (defense of property); Williams
v. State, 27 S.E.2d 109 (Ga. Ct. App. 1943) (defense of others), overruled by
Taylor v. State, 112 S.E.2d 12 (Ga. Ct. App. 1959); State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d
8 (S.C. 1989) (self-defense). These defenses also premise justification on the de-
fendant's actual or reasonable perception of the victim's behavior.
30. The result is that the criminal law arbitrarily covers certain victim li-
ability situations but not others. Victim Wrongs compares the following situa-
tions covered by the criminal law:
1. The victim, an abusive boyfriend, hits the defendant and leaves. The
defendant, in response, throws his belongings out the window. The
defendant is charged with destruction of property.
2. The victim has extorted money from the defendant until he is destitute.
The defendant later attempts to steal some money from the victim. The
defendant is arrested for attempted theft.
3. The defendant, a serially abused wife, kills her sleeping husband. The
defendant is charged with murder.
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The first article in this project, Victim Wrongs: The
Case for a General Criminal Defense Based on Wrongful
Victim Behavior in an Era of Victims' Rights ("Victim
Wrongs"),31 advocates as a response to the one-sided nature
of victim characterizations in the privatization trend a non-
specific victim liability defense. It proposes a general de-
fense that mitigates punishment or exculpates defendants
when their criminal behavior occurs in direct response to
wrongful behavior on the part of the victim. The term "non-
specific" denotes that the defense applies to any criminal
defendant who responds to wrongful victim behavior, under
the specified conditions, as opposed to just murder or as-
sault defendants.32 "Nonspecific" also captures the idea that
wrongful victim behavior can include more types of behav-
4. The defendant lives in a bad neighborhood. He has been assaulted and
threatened several times by the victim, a gang member. In an effort to
prevent further attacks by the victim, the defendant hires a person in
the neighborhood to assault the victim. The defendant is arrested for
assault and conspiracy.
to ones not covered by the law:
1. The victim, an abusive boyfriend, hits the defendant. The defendant, in
response, stabs him. The defendant is arrested for aggravated assault
and asserts self-defense and provocation.
2. The victim trespasses on defendant's lawn. The defendant comes out
and hits him with a bat. The defendant is arrested for aggravated
assault and asserts defense of property.
3. The defendant's husband has hit her a couple of times in the past. The
husband goes to hit the defendant, and she grabs a gun and shoots
him. The defendant is arrested for murder and asserts self-defense.
4. The defendant is a gang member who beats up and threatens all the
children in the neighborhood. One of the children snaps and comes at
the defendant with a knife. The defendant shoots the child. The
defendant is arrested for murder and asserts self-defense.
Gruber, supra note 14, at 670-72 (footnotes omitted).
31. Gruber, supra note 14.
32. The doctrines of self-defense, provocation, defense of others and defense
of property apply to specific crimes, generally murders and assaults, rather
than to crime in general. Such doctrines do not generally apply to non-violent
crimes, for example property or economic crimes. By contrast, the Federal
Sentencing Guideline regarding victim conduct does take a more expansive ap-
proach to victim liability:
[The victim conduct] provision usually would not be relevant in the
context of non-violent offenses. There may, however, be unusual
circumstances in which substantial victim misconduct would warrant a
reduced penalty in the case of a non-violent offense. For example, an
extended course of provocation and harassment might lead a defendant
to steal or destroy property in retaliation.
18 U.S.C.A. § 5K2.10.
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ior than the current doctrines take into account.33 The ele-
ments of the nonspecific victim liability defense are as
follows:
1. The victim of the crime engaged in sufficiently
wrongful conduct;
2. The victim's conduct caused the defendant to
commit the charged offense;
3. The defendant was not predisposed to commit the
charged offense; and
4. The defendant's response balanced against the
victim's wrongful conduct dictates that the
defendant should be exculpated or his
punishment mitigated.34
Victim Wrongs offers many arguments in favor of the
nonspecific victim liability defense. First, by allowing the
criminal law to account for victims not only as wronged
actors but also wrongful actors,35 the defense serves as a le-
gal response to the unilateral, inaccurate, and dangerous
narratives of victimization." In addition, the victim liability
33. For example, self-defense is predicated on the wrongful victim behavior
of imminently threatening the life of another. Certainly, there are other
wrongful actions that may be undertaken by victims, for example, threatening
future injury, economic destruction or other non-violent harms. See Gruber,
supra note 14, at Part III for a discussion of wrongful victim behavior not cov-
ered by existing victim liability law.
34. See Gruber, supra note 14, at Part IV passim for a discussion of the ele-
ments of the defense.
35. See Gruber, supra note 14, at 650-51:
[RIather than formulating a general argument against the victims'
rights movement, this Article proposes an alternate solution to the
privatization problem. It posits that the criminal law should
incorporate a more complete and realistic view of the victim. The
criminal law should account for the victim, not only as a wronged actor,
but also as a wrongful actor where appropriate. The Article will show
how the victims' rights trend logically dictates an increased focus on
victim liability.
(footnotes omitted).
36. Television images, like those exhibited in "America's Most Wanted," fuel
stereotypical and one-sided views of victims:
The series, which featured reenactments of actual crimes followed by
pleas to viewers to help catch the still-at-large perpetrators,... was
not only sensational and melodramatic in form and style, it was
explicitly oriented toward a view of crime as a family matter, for it
invariably pitted victims of traditional nuclear families against the
harrowing images of criminals as antisocial loners and lunatics preying
on women and especially children. Michael Linder, one of the series
producers, explained the criteria for choosing cases for the series in an
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defense, it turns out, refines the current criminal law in de-
sirable ways37 and helps deconstruct and reconceptualize
doctrines that have institutionalized patriarchal and racist
belief systems.38
This article is the second part of an ongoing project to
develop and justify the nonspecific victim liability defense.
While Victim Wrongs discussed the need for the defense,
explained how the defense refines the law in positive ways,
and touched on the elements of the defense, it left many is-
sues to be discussed further. Victim Wrongs justifies the
victim liability defense by appealing to the problem of the
one-sided victim, the doctrinal coherence of the defense, and
the defense's positive social impacts. It does not, however,
examine philosophical justifications 39 of the defense.
The project of this article is to respond prospectively to
potential criticisms of the defense based in penal theory. To
issue of TV Guide: "A drug dealer who shoots another drug dealer is
not as compelling as a child molester or murderer .... If a man
brutalizes innocent children, that definitely adds points." Such a
hierarchy of victimization is a mainstay of the Victims' Rights
Movement, which plays upon notions of decent families besieged by
violent amoral criminals.
Elayne Rapping, Television, Melodrama, and the Rise of the Victims' Rights
Movement, 43 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 665, 675-76 (2000) (citing Anna Williams,
Domesticity and the Aetiology of Crime in America's Most Wanted, CAMERA
OBSCURA 97, 97-98 (January-May 1993); Van Gordon Sauter, Rating the Reality
Shows and Keeping Tabs on the Tabloids, TV GUIDE, May 2, 1992, at 18).
37. The nonspecific victim liability defense unifies the disjointed collection
of specific victim liability laws into a singular defense that applies to all crimes
and all wrongful victim behavior. In addition, the nonspecific victim liability de-
fense makes the law more coherent and fair by tempering the unwavering focus
on defendant mens rea. Consequently, it reforms the system that arbitrarily
discriminates against defendants who have been provoked, but are charged un-
der statutes requiring reckless or negligent intents. Moreover, the defense can
serve to police the boundaries of judicial, prosecutorial, and juror discretion and
help prevent the misguided focus on gender-related, racial, and socioeconomic
characteristics. See Gruber, supra note 14, at Part III.
38. The defense helps solve the "reasonable racist" and "provoked abuser"
dilemmas by requiring wrongfulness on the part of the victim as a predicate to
utilization of the defense. The misogynist defendant who kills his wife for at-
tempting to leave him will not be able to claim that he was "provoked" by her
attempts. Likewise, the racist defendant will not receive a defense when he
claims that he "reasonably" feared the presence of an African-American on the
subway. In both of these cases, the victims have not engaged in wrongful con-
duct; thus, the defendants actions are not excusable no matter how much
outrage the defendant actually felt. See id.
39. By this, I mean a particular mode of justification of criminal punishment
that is based in penal theory.
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that end, Part I of the article will explain the importance of
penological discourse in criminal law theory and introduce
several broad categories of penal philosophy. Part II of the
paper will discuss the deontological criticism that the non-
specific victim liability defense inaccurately reflects senti-
ments regarding just deserts. In responding to this impor-
tant objection, the paper will distinguish the non-specific
victim liability defense from the seemingly analogous tort
principles of contributory and comparative negligence. Part
III of the article will briefly respond to consequentialist cri-
tiques of the defense, which involve concerns over deter-
rence, rehabilitation, incapacitation, and redistribution.
I. PENOLOGICAL DISCOURSE
Penal theory is a specific subset of moral philosophy
that explores the theoretical bases for criminal sanctions.
Defenders of particular criminal sanctions or defenses seek
to find articulable bases for validation in the moral tenets of
penal theory.4' Indeed, the dialogue of victims' rights and
the tough-on-crime movement incorporates moral philoso-
phy in the justification of proposed reforms and in support
of existing laws. For example, death penalty proponents
appeal to the retributive ideal of just deserts as a ground
for capital punishment, especially in the face of evidence
that death sentences are not deterrent.42 Alternatively,
those in favor of indefinite civil commitment of pedophiles
articulate the consequentialist goal of incapacitation as a
40. See generally A READER ON PUNISHMENT (R.A. Duff & David Garland
eds., 1994).
41. Penal theories describe in theoretical terms why the state is permitted
to engage in punishment. Scholars argue that the states use of force against its
own citizenry demands philosophical justification. See R.A. DUFF, TRIALS &
PUNISHMENTS 4 (1986) ("It is agreed that a system of criminal punishment
stands in need of some strenuous and persuasive justification....").
42. In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), Justice Stewart emphasized
the retributive value of the death penalty:
The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and
channeling that instinct in the administration of criminal justice serves
an important purpose in promoting the stability of a society governed
by law. When people begin to believe that organized society is
unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment
they 'deserve,' then there are sown the seeds of anarchy-of self-help,
vigilante justice, and lynch law.
Id. at 183 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart,
J., concurring)).
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rationale to respond to those who object on retributivist
grounds to the appearance of unfair double punishment.43
Analyzing the wealth of legal and philosophical litera-
ture regarding penal theory, one can distill two broad
categories of theory: "Deontological" and "consequentialist."
A deontological doctrine, also known as an "agent-relative"
doctrine, is a theory in which "the moral principles govern-
ing human action are exclusively agent-relative.' This
means that morality derives from a source independent of
empirical outcomes.45 A consequentialist doctrine, also
known as a "teleological" doctrine, "in its purest and sim-
plest form is a moral doctrine which says that the right act
in any given situation is the one that will produce the best
overall outcome."'6 In other words, a consequentialist theory
43. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357-58 (1997):
"[Tihe liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every
person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each
person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly free from
restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is
necessarily subject for the common good. On any other basis organized
society could not exist with safety to its members." Accordingly, States
have in certain narrow circumstances provided for the forcible civil
detainment of people who are unable to control their behavior and who
thereby pose a danger to the public health and safety.
(quoting Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905)).
44. Samuel Scheffler, Introduction to CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS CRITICS 5
(Samuel Scheffler ed., 1988).
45. Paul Robinson offers a deontological account of justice, irrespective of
consequences:
Here is what I mean by doing justice: Giving a wrongdoer punishment
according to what he deserves-no more, no less-by taking account of
all those factors that we, as a society, think are relevant in assessing
personal blameworthiness. Justice, then, requires that, in assessing an
offender's blameworthiness, we must take account of not only the
seriousness of the offense and its consequences but also the offender's
own state of mind and mental and emotional capacities, as well as any
circumstances of the offense that may suggest justification or excuse.
Paul H. Robinson, The Virtues of Restorative Processes, the Vices of "Restorative
Justice," 2003 UTAH L. REV. 375, 380 (footnote omitted).
46. Scheffier, supra note 44, at 1. Russell Christopher defines consequen-
tialism as follows:
Consequentialism is the view that the value of an action or course of
conduct is to be assessed from its consequences. A consequentialist
theory of punishment would justify punishment on the basis of the
good consequences promoted by punishment. Versions of
consequentialism vary based on the type of consequence perceived to be
relevant. The most well-known version of consequentialism is Jeremy
Bentham's utilitarianism in which a course of conduct is evaluated by
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dictates that one ought to do that which best achieves a
desired41 outcome. Thus, deontologists depart from conse-
quentialists in two important ways: 1) They hold that one
may be forbidden from doing something even if it would
produce the best outcome; and 2) even if one is not forbid-
den from doing something, one is not compelled to do it
merely because it produces the best results.48
One immediate difficulty in relating any specific
defense, crime, or even element of a defense or crime to an
overarching theory of punishment is that penal theories
often address the issue of why we punish (the goal of pun-
ishment in general), but less often address specifically the
conduct to be punished, the type of punishment, and the
extent of punishment.49 It is up to the individual proponent
the principle of utility or the amount of happiness and suffering that is
generated by the conduct. Other versions of consequentialism judge
acts based on their promotion of, for example, autonomy, achievement,
or fairness. The principal consequentialist theories of punishment jus-
tify punishment based on the good consequences of rehabilitating the
offender so that she will not commit future crimes, incapacitating the
offender so that he cannot commit crimes during the term of imprison-
ment, deterring the offender from committing future crimes (specific
deterrence), and deterring others in society from committing future
crimes (general deterrence).
Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of "Just"
Punishment, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 843, 856 (2001-2002) (footnotes omitted).
47. I say "desired" rather than "the best outcome" because within conse-
quentialist camps, the debate becomes more complex when, after it is settled
that one ought to maximize the good, one is charged with determining what
constitutes "the good."
48. Scheffler, supra note 44, at 4. Aaron J. Rappaport explains:
[J]ust deserts is a deontological principle. That means that justification
should be grounded on the inherent rightness or wrongness of criminal
conduct-not on its consequences with respect to some other principle
of value. In this sense, just deserts does not acknowledge that there is
some higher moral principle P that determines the relevance and
importance of retributive claims.
Aaron J. Rappaport, Rationalizing the Commission: The Philosophical Premises
of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 52 EMORY L.J. 557,626 (2003).
49. Take, for example, a retributive theory espousing that we should punish
those who deserve it. The questions that remain are: (1) who deserves it, (2) for
which conduct should there be punishment, (3) what should that punishment
be, and (4) how shall it be inflicted. Theorists have recognized a similar set of
questions:
One commentator has declared that an adequate justification of
punishment must provide answers to the following four questions: "Is
the practice of punishment ever justifiable and if so under what
conditions? What kinds of punishment are justified and must they
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of the criminal sanction or defense to draw upon theory as a
rhetorical tool for arguing in favor of her proposal.0 Compli-
cating matters is the fact that considerations other than
merely why we punish come into play in erecting a system
of criminal laws, for example, procedural values like democ-
racy and due process."' A utilitarian may reject a highly
involve suffering? Whom are we entitled to punish? Who is morally
entitled to inflict punishment?"
Christopher, supra note 46, at 855 (emphasis in original) (quoting A. Wesley
Cragg, Punishment, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 706-707
(Christopher Berry Gray ed., 1999)).
50. This is quite obviously a very cynical view of the importance of penal
theory to the criminal law, but it is reality. In practice, legislators talk about
the moral significance or deterrent effect of putting killers to death. For
example, Pheonix attorney and former Chief Assistant Arizona Attorney
General Steve Twist declared, "[T]he death penalty affirms our highest moral
values by protecting innocent life through insisting on the forfeiture of depraved
life. It is a curious morality that finds barbaric ritualism in the execution of
depraved murderers, when the evidence of both specific and general deterrence,
the protection of innocent life, is so strong." Steve Twist, Capital Punishment is
Good Public Policy: A Response to Gerber and O'Connor, 39 ARIZ. ATT'Y 17, 19
(Nov. 2002), available at http://azbar.org/ArizonaAttorney/pdf upload/
AZAT1102DeathPRO.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2004). Even particular
prosecutorial choices are justified by retributivism or deterrence. Theorists
comment:
This age-old debate over the justification of punishment is not merely
of theoretical interest. The resolution of a wide-ranging spectrum of
practical issues may crucially hinge on, or be substantially influenced
by, the particular justification of punishment perceived to be
defensible. What is perceived to be the leading theory of punishment
influences legislatures' articulation of the purpose of punishment and
courts' construction of such statutory articulations, which in turn,
affect a host of other practical doctrines, policies, and procedures.
Prominent among these are the viability of the victims' rights
movement, the weakening of probation and parole, the "three strikes
and you're out" legislation aimed at recidivists, and perhaps most
significantly, the morality of the death penalty. Capital punishment
has traditionally been supported by, and associated with,
retributivism. That support was further strengthened with the
Supreme Court's enthroning retributivism as the "primary justification
for the death penalty."
Christopher, supra note 46, at 850-51 (footnotes omitted). Though utilizing the
rhetorical value of penal theory is arguably an empirical reality, Ronald
Dworkin specifically rejects such a practice, which he terms "outside in" rea-
soning, whereby the practical problem-solver "must shop from among ready-
made" racks of theories. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION 29 (1993).
51. Describing and justifying a defense on the basis of penal theory is, itself,
not an uncontroversial choice. A legal positivist would argue what ought to be a
crime is essentially whatever the legislature says is a crime. See generally
H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
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effective criminal sanction on the basis that the majority of
people in society disagree with it.52 A retributivist might re-
frain from punishing one convicted of a crime, whose
promulgation violates substantive due process.53 This is not
to say, however, that penal theory is merely a rhetorical
game. It serves an important function in the law. Russell
Christopher offers the following explanation of the need for
penal theory:
LAW 4-5 (Oxford Univ. Press 1992) (1968). Claire Finkelstein argues that the
American legal system employs predominantly a positivistic method of legal
justification:
Our legal system, in short, takes a predominantly positivistic approach
to the notion of crime, meaning that there is no particular structure or
content that legislation denominated "criminal" must have. As Henry
Hart wrote a number of years ago, "If one were to judge from the
notions apparently underlying many judicial opinions, and the overt
language even of some of them ... a crime is anything which is called a
crime, and a criminal penalty is simply the penalty provided for doing
anything which has been given that name."
Claire Finkelstein, Positivism and the Notion of an Offense, 88 CAL. L. REV. 335,
336 (2000) (quoting Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404 (1958) (citations omitted)). I would describe positivist
justifications as relying on second level values, namely, the value of legislative
procedures institutions. What should be considered logically prior to, and per-
haps apart from, the determination of what the legislature has done is the
determination of what ought to be done. This is a question of theory. See id.
("Academics search for criteria to determine which activities are proper objects
of prohibition, based on their adherence to norms that they believe ought to
govern the use of the criminal sanction."). Id. Joel Feinberg offers the following
rejection of positivism:
It is important to emphasize ... that desert is a moral concept in the
sense that it is logically prior to and independent of public institutions
and their rules, not in the sense that it is an instrument of an ethereal
"moral" counterpart of our public institutions.
JOEL FEINBERG, DOING & DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY
87 (1970).
52. That is to say that even those legislatures who tout the deterrent effect
of proposed legislation will not cry foul if, through legitimate processes, the
measures are not adopted. Thus, penal theory may be criticized as merely a
mental game by positivists who believe that law is a function of legislatures,
which, are, in turn, a function of majority rule.
53. Retributivists are not necessarily committed to supporting punishment
of those guilty of a crime which embodied an illegitimate exercise of government
power. In State v. Saeiz, 489 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 1986), the Florida Supreme Court
struck down a statute prohibiting the possession of embossing machines,
observing that "[government) power.., is not boundless and is confined to
those acts which may be reasonably construed as expedient for protection of the
public health, safety, welfare, or morals." Id. at 1127. A retributivist need not be
committed to the argument that by virtue of being convicted of possessing an
embossing machine, the possessor "deserves" punishment.
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Why do we need to justify punishment? After all, crime and
punishment seem to go together, as the old Frank Sinatra song
goes, like "love and marriage" and a "horse and carriage." To doubt
the legitimacy of punishment would seem to cast doubt on the
enterprise of criminal law itself. Why would we bother to
promulgate the prohibitions of the criminal law if they could be
violated with impunity? For violations of the norms of criminal
law, punishment seems to be an obviously fitting response. But
punishment does require justification, for the same reason we
consider conduct violating the core prohibitions of our criminal law
to be wrong. Punishment involves the deliberate infliction of pain,
suffering, and deprivation, which is prima facie wrong. So too,
committing homicide or causing grievous bodily damage, under
ordinary circumstances, is prima facie wrong. But just as the
prima facie wrong of homicide may be justified or negated when
committed under circumstances of self-defense as a response to a
criminal attack, so also the state's infliction of the suffering and
deprivation constituting punishment may be susceptible to
justification as a response to the commission of a crime.5 4
As Russell Christopher argues above, penal theory, like
procedural values, serves an important function of discur-
sive legitimation. Beyond mere discourse, however, the ten-
sion between deontology and consequentialism and the
struggle to balance them is deeply rooted not only in the
justifying language of criminal laws but also in the psyche
of Western society. Society struggles to define laws to
reflect our senses of justice, fairness, goodness, and expedi-
ency. Below, I describe generally the broad categories of pe-
nal theory, including their benefits and drawbacks, as a
background to Parts II & III, which address the potential
penological criticisms of the nonspecific victim liability
defense.
A Deontological Theories of Punishment
Deontological theories of punishment, like deontological
theories generally, justify punishment on grounds other
than future positive results flowing from the punishment.55
The most influential deontological penal theory is retribu-
tivism. Retributivism is most often associated with the
work of Immanuel Kant, who opines:
54. Christopher, supra note 46, at 852-53.
55. See supra text accompanying notes 44-45.
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Juridical punishment can never be administered merely as a
means of promoting another good either with regard to the
criminal himself or to civil society, but must in all cases be
imposed only because the individual on whom it is inflicted has
committed a crime. For one man ought never to be dealt with
merely as a means subservient to the purpose of another 
.... 56
While there are many glosses on this same theme,57
"[r]etributivism is a very straightforward theory of punish-
ment: We are justified in gunishing because and only be-
cause offenders deserve it."
Unlike the consequentialist theories that will be dis-
cussed later, retributivism gives very little guide to who,
when, and how much to punish.59 Not only that, it fails to
address whether moral culpability attaches to an act, a per-
son, or some combination of both."M Perhaps the most cogent
criticism of retributivism in particular and of deontological
theories in general is that they are ultimately unsatisfying
because they beg the further question of what it means to
"deserve punishment."6 1 Moreover, deontology prohibits the
56. IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (W. Hastie trans., 1887),
reprinted in CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 102, 102
(Sanford H. Kadish & Stephen J. Schulhofer eds., 7th ed. 2001).
57. For a basic view of retributivist thought, one need look no further than
the Bible. See IGOR PRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISHMENT 13 (1989) ("The
history of the retributive view of punishment begins with the biblical and
talmudic ethical and legal ideas .... ."). The concept in proportionality of actions
and consequences has been a theme throughout the history of retributivist
thought. See, e.g., G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 129
(Allen W. Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1821)
(declaring that punishment is "the crime turned round against itself").
58. Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY,
CHARACTER AND EMOTIONS 179 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987), reprinted in
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES, supra note 56, at 108.
59. The guidance offered by Kant is that punishment "must in all cases be
imposed on [the offender] only on the ground that he committed a crime."
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 100 (John Ladd
trans., 1965) (1797).
60. The question is whether retribution theories posit that moral blamewor-
thiness attaches to the person who commits bad acts or to the act itself. This
brings up the difficult question of the role of criminal character in criminal law.
See generally Chris William Sanchirico, Character Evidence and the Object of
Trial, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1227 (2001).
61. R.A. Duff explains:
The central problem for a retributivist, whether negative or positive, is
to explain this idea of desert. Punishment is supposed to be justified as
an intrinsically appropriate response to crime; the concept of "desert" is
supposed to indicate that justificatory relationship between past crime
2004] RIGHTING VICTIM WRONGS 451
and present punishment. But what is that relationship? How does
crime call for punishment or make punishment appropriate? It is not
enough simply to appeal to the supposedly shared intuition that the
guilty deserve to suffer, since such an intuition, however widely
shared, needs explanation: what do they deserve to suffer, and why?
R.A. Duff, Penal Communications: Recent Work in the Philosophy of
Punishment, in 20 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1, 7-8 (Michael
Tonry ed., 1996) (citations omitted). Here one confronts the ever-present philo-
sophical problem of first principles. Ultimately, one can formulate either a
consequentialist rationale for the circumstances under which someone deserves
punishment, or one can base criminal prohibitions on first principles, which are
inherently arbitrary. Richard Ned Lebow describes the tension as follows:
Philosophers from Kant on struggled to build an alternative
metaphysical foundation for ethics; they failed because there are no
incontrovertible first principles. Attempts to base such systems on
feeling and customs are all open to the challenge of being arbitrary and
culturally biased.
Richard Ned Lebow, Ethics and Interests, 96 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 75, 75
(2002). The tension between the arbitrary nature of first principles and the
contingent nature of consequentialist justifications has led some reformers,
most notably the pragmatists, to reject this particular justificatory enterprise
all together. Thomas Grey describes how pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce
[R]eversed the Kantian hierarchy, and assimilated all human science,
speculative philosophy, and moral inquiry into the category of the
pragmatic. All judgments-scientific and moral as well as prudential
and technical-were contingent, probabilistic, relative to a situation
and to the interests of an agent or a community of agents. Thought was
no longer to be conceived as something distinct from practice, but
rather it simply was practice, or activity, in its deliberative or reflective
aspect.
Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN L. REV. 787, 803
(1988-1989). See also Charles Sanders Peirce, What Pragmatism Is (1905), in 5
COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, 411, 413 (Charles
Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., 1934). In Kant's defense, he most likely would
not agree that the basis for his moral theory, the categorical imperative, is com-
pletely arbitrary. Kant premises his moral theory on non-contradiction (logic),
which comes from the categories. The categories are at once a necessary and
contingent part of the human conditions (both a priori and synthetic). Thus,
Kant's first moral principles comes from the a priori conditions of human cogni-
tion. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS passim (James W. Ellington trans., Hackett Publishing 1981) (1785).
Although perhaps overcoming the first principles problem, Kant is now subject
to the criticism that his own moral theory has become contingent. For example,
philosopher Willard Quine contends that logic as manifested by the distinction
between the analytic and synthetic, is itself a contingent choice. See generally
WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW (1953). Thus, one
could posit that there is nothing that necessarily dictates that moral rules
should come from logic, or even that the fact of the human condition has any-
thing to do with morality (the "is/ought distinction").
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theorist from answering that question by appealing to any-
thing in the empirical world. By prohibiting consequential
analysis in any form, the retributive justification of pun-
ishment can seem hopelessly vague and arbitrary: 3
[O]nce retributivism departs from desert as the sole justification
for punishment by resorting to consequences, and since the
consequences may be obtained by punishing an offender without
desert, retributivism is subject to the very same problems of
consequentialist theories-justifying intentional punishment of
particular, identifiable innocents and the use of offenders as mere
means.
Retributivism, however, is only one way in which deon-
tology manifests in penal theory. Apart from the formal
doctrine of retributivism, deontology generally offers all-
important limiting principles that may be used to temper
absolutely consequentialist doctrines.65  Principles like
62. For example, although Kant's categorical imperative is premised on the
human condition, which is synthetic rather than analytic, it is not premised on
a posteriori experiential justification. See KANT, supra note 61, at 29. R.A. Duff
discusses the nonempirical nature retributivism:
A nonconsequentialist insists that actions and practices may be right
or wrong in virtue of their intrinsic character, independently of their
consequences. Thus what unites retributivist conceptions of
punishment, insofar as they are essentially nonconsequentialist, is
their insistence that punishment must be justified, not (primarily) by
reference to its contingently beneficial effects, but in terms of its
intrinsic character as a response to past wrongdoing. Hence the central
retributivist claim that punishment is justified if and only if it is
deserved in virtue of a past crime ....
Duff, supra note 61, at 6-7.
63. Richard Epstein argues that the only thing that can save the deontolo-
gist from hopeless arbitrariness is appealing to utilitarian principles:
One has to show why any given configuration of rights is superior to its
rival conceptions, an undertaking that typically requires an appeal to
consequences, less for particular cases, and more for some overall
assessment of how alternative legal regimes play out in the long run.
In a word, one has to become a utilitarian of some stripe to justify rules
in terms of the consequences they bring about.
Richard A. Epstein, The Tort/Crime Distinction: A Generation Later, 76 B.U. L.
REV. 1, 3 (1996).
64. Christopher, supra note 46, at 975.
65. Hurd observes:
[Tihe principal payoff of deontological maxims is their ability to define
and patrol the borders of consequential justification. Thus, good
consequences cannot justify anything that is categorically forbidden,
but they can justify whatever is not categorically forbidden.
Heidi M. Hurd, The Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. REV. 249, 254 (1996).
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fairness and proportionality limit the consequentialist from
the unfettered use of any means to achieve good ends.66 For
example, the argument that we should not impose life
imprisonment on drunk drivers even if it saves many more
lives in the long run because to do so would be unfair,
draws upon the deontological limiting principle of fairness.
Leo Katz observes:
The criminal law, unlike most other branches of law, especially
unlike the tort law, is apt to cultivate one's non-utilitarian (or, if
you prefer, nonconsequentialist) intuitions. It is near-impossible to
be a thoroughgoing utilitarian about the criminal law. Even those
who think that deterrence has an important role to play in
criminal law... generally refuse to accept it as the only aim. At
the very least, they think deterrence needs to be tempered by
other, deontological, i.e. nonconsequentialist, kinds of concerns.
Only thus are they able to explain, for instance, why we are loath
to impose life imprisonment for drunk driving, even though doing
so would save many more lives than it would ruin. Only thus are
they able to explain the strong check that the proportionality
principle puts on any utilitarian aims we are pursuing.
Retributive theory counsels the proponent of any given
defense or law not to justify the defense merely"8 on the ba-
sis that it produces the best (i.e. most efficient, most satis-
66. A pure retributivist would probably object to the idea of mixing conse-
quentialist and deontological penal doctrine. For example Michael Moore states:
[RIetributivism is not "the view that only the guilty are to be
punished." A retributivist will subscribe to such a view, but that is not
what is distinctive about retributivism. The distinctive aspect of
retributivism is that the moral desert of an offender is a sufficient
reason to punish him or her; the principle [that only the guilty may be
punished] makes such moral desert only a necessary condition of
punishment. Other reasons-typically, crime prevention reasons-
must be added to moral desert, in this view, for punishment to be
justified. Retributivism has no room for such additional reasons. That
future crime might also be prevented by punishment is a happy
surplus for a retributivist, but no part of the justification for punishing.
Moore supra note 58, at 107-08 (alteration does not appear in original docu-
ment). The criticism again is that "deserving punishment" does not exist in a
vacuum. Either the retributivist can ignore all empirical considerations and
commit to a position that seems hopelessly arbitrary or accept some empirical
considerations and seem less deontological.
67. Leo Katz, A Look at Tort Law With Criminal Law Blinders, 76 B.U.L.
REV. 307, 307 (1996).
68. However, the pure retributivist would probably say more than, "do not
'merely' look at consequences;" she would say, "do not look at consequences at
all."
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fying to the public, or most deterrent) results.69 The defense
or law must speak to the moral culpability of the defendant.
To use self-defense as an example, the retributivist would
reject any argument that self-defense rules ought exist be-
cause they prevent potential aggressors from engaging in
violent, provocative behavior against others (because the
other is then justified in killing the aggressor), in favor of
the argument that a person who acts in self-defense does
not deserve to be punished. Self-defense has been justified
precisely in this nonconsequentialist manner:
The retributive theory of public punishment is a "rational" and
principled theory . . . The first theory of self-defense simply
proposes that a private individual is entitled to defend herself in a
way that serves retributive goals. The real facts, the real
culpability of the attacker, should be directly relevant to the scope
of her entitlement.7 °
B. Consequentialist Theories of Punishment
Consequentialist theories of punishment justify pun-
ishment on the ground that it produces some desired state
of affairs in society.71 The desired state of affairs can consist
of many different things, for example deterring crime or
saving money."2 In this sense, depending on the specific
69. As stated before, a facet of deontological thought is the prevention of
empirical justification. See supra note 66.
70. Kenneth W. Simons, Book Review, Self-Defense, Mens Rea, and
Bernhard Goetz, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1179, 1182-83 (1989) (book review).
71. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of conse-
quentialism. Russell Christopher describes a shared characteristic of conse-
quentialist penal theories:
[Clonsequentialist justifications of punishment share the goal of crime
prevention. Both crime and punishment are evils, but punishment is
only a qualified evil. The evil of punishment may be outweighed by the
good consequences that it generates. That is, punishment is a
necessary evil that may be justified by its diminution of the incidence
of crime.
Christopher, supra note 46, at 858-59 (footnotes omitted).
72. These types of consequentialist arguments are often made in favor of
and against the death penalty:
Death penalty advocates argue that the death penalty deters would-be
criminals by sending a message that violent crime will not be tolerated.
Conversely, opponents argue not only that the death penalty fails to
deter individual criminals, but also that the death penalty fosters-or
2004] RIGHTING VICTIM WRONGS 455
ends favored by the consequentialist, consequentialist penal
theories can give much more guidance as to who, how, and
when to punish.73 There are, however, several criticisms of
consequentialist theories of punishment. As stated previ-
ously, all consequentialist penal theories necessarily
depend on the empirical success of the criminal law in
achieving the desired state of affairs.74 The theories lose
their prescriptive steam if future empirical study shows
at least fails to deter-violent crime by sending a message that violence
is the answer.
Paul Schoeman, Easing the Fear of Too Much Justice: A Compromise Proposal
to Revise the Racial Justice Act, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 543, 547 (1995).
73. For example, if the goal is the prevention of child sex offenses, punitive
policies and civil commitment procedures will specifically target the class of
child sex offense defendants and the class of child sex crimes. See, e.g., KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (2003) (Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators;
Legislative Findings):
The legislature finds that there exists an extremely dangerous group of
sexually violent predators who have a mental abnormality or
personality disorder and who are likely to engage in repeat acts of
sexual violence if not treated for their mental abnormality or
personality disorder. Because the existing civil commitment procedures
under K.S.A. 59-2901 et seq. and amendments thereto are inadequate
to address the special needs of sexually violent predators and the risks
they present to society, the legislature determines that a separate
involuntary civil commitment process for the potentially long-term
control, care and treatment of sexually violent predators is necessary.
The legislature also determines that because of the nature of the
mental abnormalities or personality disorders from which sexually
violent predators suffer, and the dangers they present, it is necessary
to house involuntarily committed sexually violent predators in an
environment separate from persons involuntarily committed under
K.S.A. 59-2901 et seq. and amendments thereto.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 46-47. In other words, if a penal
measure does not in fact deter, then its enactment cannot be justified on the
grounds of deterrence. This is exemplified in death penalty jurisprudence. Em-
pirical studies bore out that the death penalty was not, in fact, a deterrent to
crimes. Thus, in justifying the death penalty Supreme Court justices moved
away from utilitarian to retributivist arguments:
The foregoing contentions that society's expression of moral outrage
through the imposition of the death penalty pre-empts the citizenry
from taking the law into its own hands and reinforces moral values are
not retributive in the purest sense. They are essentially utilitarian in
that they portray the death penalty as valuable because of its
beneficial results. These justifications for the death penalty are
inadequate because the penalty is, quite clearly I think, not necessary
to the accomplishment of those results. There remains for
consideration, however, what might be termed the properly retributive
justification for the death penalty that the death penalty is
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them to fail to achieve their objectives. This makes conse-
quentialism, in essence, a slave to future results and only
truly valid retrospectively,75 which, in turn, makes its pur-
ported prospective justificatory force at best speculative7"
and at worst mere rhetoric. The second and perhaps more
persuasive criticism is that consequentialism counsels the
use of unjust, unfair, or immoral means to achieve good
ends, so long as there is a net balance of utility (however
defined)." This, in turn, necessitates the application of
appropriate, not because of beneficial effect on society, but because the
taking of the murderer's life is itself morally good.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 227, 238-39 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring).
75. One can speculate about the deterrent effects of a measure. If, however,
future study shows that the measure did not in fact decrease crime, then the
argument must be abandoned. See supra note 74. Deterrence theory has been
criticized heavily on this exact level. Critics contend that punishment, as
exacted in the United States, does not actually deter crime, for several reasons.
First, the likelihood of punishment for crime is not great enough to serve as a
disincentive when weighed against the benefits of crime. Second, and perhaps
more importantly, the actual psychology of those who commit crimes suggests
that they do not evaluate their choices purely by weighing the pain of
punishment against the benefit of crime. See Paul. H. Robinson, The Utility of
Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453, 459-65 (1997). To the first argument at least,
uber-utilitarian Jeremy Bentham who states, "The evil of punishment must be
made to exceed the advantage of the offence," has a ready response: Merely be-
cause the United States has not succeeded in achieving efficient deterrence does
not mean that deterrence is not a proper justification of punishment. It simply
means that deterrence is not a proper justification of that specific system of
punishment. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 325-26 (1931),
reprinted in CRIMINAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 16 at 38.
76. See Epstein, supra note 63, at 3 ("A utilitarian approach is frequently
attacked on the ground that the critical outcomes needed to fuel the system are
invariably indeterminate.") (citations omitted).
77. This is a common criticism of ends-based reasoning in general. Guyora
Binder and Nicholas Smith frame the retributivist argument against utilitarian
penal justification as follows:
[Tihe retributivist arguments that were most influential among
philosophers and legal scholars asserted that utilitarianism could lead
to excessive rather than insufficient punishment. Retributivists evoked
the libertarian sensibilities of academics by warning that
utilitarianism could justify punishment that transgressed the
retributivist prohibition against undeserved punishment. Thus,
indeterminate sentencing could lead to lengthy terms for minor
offenses, based on discretionary and perhaps prejudicial predictions of
dangerousness, or assessments of progress toward rehabilitation.
Harsh punishment of a few hapless individuals might effectively deter
millions from committing minor offenses. Worst of all, deterrence
might be served, public fear might be dissipated, and vigilante violence
forestalled, by framing and punishing innocent persons.
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deontological limiting principles like fairness, proportional-
ity, and due process to temper the means employed by the
consequentialist."
Despite the criticisms of consequentialist thought, in
creating the law, legislatures are often moved by utilitarian
concerns. When lawmakers propose criminal sanctions,
they do so because they want to stop crime. When lawmak-
ers allocate money to education, they do so because they
want to achieve, for example, higher rates of literacy.
Being goal-oriented is deeply rooted in law and public pol-
icy. Any proponent of a law or defense must be prepared to
meet and address potential arguments that her proposal
produces net disutility. In the criminal law context, utili-
tarian arguments generally fall into the broad subcatego-
ries listed below.
1. Deterrence. Deterrence theory is likely the most
pervasive utilitarian justification of criminal punishment."
Simply put, the theory dictates that criminal punishment is
justified by its ability to reduce crime. Deterrence theories
abound in criminal law from the most straightforward for-
mulations like those of Jeremy Bentham, who postulates
simply that punishment should be geared to make the cost
to the criminal exceed the advantage,8' to more complicated
theories like that of Dan Kahan, extolling the deterrent ef-
Guyora Binder & Nicholas J. Smith, Framed: Utilitarianism and Punishment of
the Innocent, 32 RUTGERS L. J. 115, 118 (2000).
78. This, of course, indicates that both deontological and consequentialist
justifications are necessary but not sufficient alone as grounds for a system of
criminal punishment.
79. For this reason, United States Public Laws, for example, contain
preliminary sections in which Congress makes factual findings about the prob-
lems they seek to remedy through legislation.
80. Experts observe:
The most influential consequentialist theory justifies punishment
based on the general deterrence of future crime. To achieve general
deterrence, the appearance or publicity of punishment is crucial.
Actual punishment, without society's awareness, generates no general
deterrent effect; but apparent punishment, even if without actual
punishment, does provide general deterrence. Actual punishment
serves only to produce apparent punishment. As a result, retributivists
have criticized deterrence-based theories for being unable to justify
actual punishment.
Christopher, supra note 46, at 857-58 (footnotes omitted).
81. Bentham states: "The evil of punishment must be made to exceed the
advantage of the offence." BENTHAM, supra note 75, at 38.
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fects of targeted public order policing. 2 Where any given
criminal law or defense fits into deterrence theory is diffi-
cult to determine and subject to speculation.83 Deterrence
theory, like consequentialism in general, is vulnerable to a
wide array of criticisms, both philosophical and empirical.
The philosophical objections concern the tendency of deter-
rence theories to reduce morality to empirical observation
and to allow the use of unfair or disproportionate means to
achieve deterrence. 4 The empirical objections concern the
viability of punishment as a method to deter crime. Experts
observe that deterrence theory is:
[Biased on complete and utter ignorance of what violent people are
actually like. [There is an] endless legion of mass murderers and
assassins both "public" and "private," who are as ready to be killed
as to kill-whose rage is so passionate and so blinding that it has
caused the subjective distinction between killing and being killed
to be all but obliterated and meaningless . . . . [Elven when it
seems motivated by "rational" self-interest, [violence] is the end
product of a series of irrational, self-destructive, and unconscious
motives.8 5
Despite the shaky empirical ground upon which deter-
rence theory rests, society cares about crime reduction.86
Thus, criminal laws which, at least in appearance, tend to
reassure the public that they will stop crime, resonate the
most strongly. Consequently, although readily objectionable
on theoretical grounds, one must take steps to address
deterrence concerns in order to gain public acceptance for
her theory of criminal law.
2. Rehabilitation. Rehabilitation, once revered by utili-
tarians like Bentham,87 is now at best a subordinate consid-
82. Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA.
L. REV. 349 passim (1997).
83. Precisely because the fit will depend upon the future success of the
policy in deterring crime. See supra text accompanying notes 74-75.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 77-78.
85. JAMES GILLIGAN, VIOLENCE 94-96, reprinted in CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES supra note 56, at 118.
86. See Gruber, supra note 14, at 664-66 (discussing political power of
tough-on-crime movement).
87. See BENTHAM, supra note 75, at 338 ("It is a great merit in a punishment
to contribute to the reformation of the offender, not only through fear of being
punished again, but by a change in his character and habits.").
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eration of penologists.8 The idea is that criminal punish-
ment exists to reform those who commit crime and/or may
commit crime in the future. 9 The reality today is that
addressing rehabilitative concerns is largely academic, as
true rehabilitation occurs less and less often in the Ameri-
can justice system."
Rehabilitation theory is at odds with deontology in the
sense that punishment is not meted out proportionally to
desert, but rather to the degree that therapy is required. In
two ways, this can be unfair. First, those easily rehabili-
tated can be punished less than they deserve. Second, those
difficult to rehabilitate are punished to a greater extent, not
for their past acts, but rather because the system is unable
to create in them a psychology that will prevent future
crimes. The key concept in relating rehabilitation to pun-
ishment is that only those who need rehabilitation should
be subjected to custody by the State. In Benthamesque
terms, the argument is that rehabilitating those who need
no rehabilitation (because they are not criminally inclined),
regardless of their culpability, produces net disutility.9 1
88. See CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 75, at 46 ("Today, we tend to think of re-
habilitation as an ancillary goal of penal incarceration, involving educational or
therapeutic 'programs' in the prison."). Id.
89. Penal law is then a means to the ends of reformation. These social
ordering goals can be quite frightening without deontological checks. It brings
to mind the idea of the society which pre-screens would-be criminals and send
them to brain-washing reformation camps. Although this scenario seems like
little more than science fiction fantasy, some theorists argue that this is what is
precisely occurring in the arena of indefinite civil commitment of child sex of-
fenders:
[S]exual predator laws have the appearance of a civil commitment law
providing care and treatment for the mentally disabled. In reality, they
are indeterminate preventive detention schemes, which deliberately
inflict suffering on individuals committed under them.
John Q. La Fond, Can Therapeutic Jurisprudence Be Normatively Neutral?
Sexual Predator Laws: Their Impact on Participants and Policy, 41 ARIZ. L.
REV. 375, 379 (1999).
90. See Richard Lowell Nygaard, Crime, Pain, and Punishment: A Skeptic's
View, 102 DICK. L. REV. 355, 362 (1998) ("Today, rehabilitation is dead. Prison
itself rehabilitates no one, and criminal sentencing has dissociated itself from
the goal of rehabilitation.").
91. See BENTHAM, supra note 75, at 36 (Punishment should not occur if it is
"efficacious," that is, it has "no power to produce an effect upon the will" and
has "no tendency towards the prevention [of crime].").
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3. Other consequentialist justifications of punishment
(incapacitation, prediction, and redistribution). There are
several more theories that justify punishment on the basis
of outcomes rather than a priori culpability, a few of which
I would like to touch upon here. Incapacitation theory is the
concept that certain individuals should be removed from
society to prevent them from harming others.92 Similarly,
some theorists argue that there is a new legal penology in
the United States centering on the management of danger-
ous groups in society.93 Both incapacitation and the man-
agement theory embrace the idea that the law does or
should respond, not to concepts of culpability, but rather to
predictions about who will commit crime in the future. Of
course, the notion that punishment should be meted out to
people, not for what they have done, but for what they will
do in the future is highly repugnant to deontologists who
adhere to the belief in just deserts.94 The predictive trend in
the United States, however, cannot be ignored. Practices
like preventive detention,95 three strikes rules," and civil
commitment of pedophiles9 7 all revolve around the principle
92. See JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABouT CRIME 145 (1983) ("When crimi-
nals are deprived of their liberty, as by imprisonment... their ability to commit
offenses against citizens is ended. We say these persons have been
'incapacitated,' and we try to estimate the amount by which crime is reduced by
this incapacitation.").
93. See Jonathan Simon, Managing the Monsters: Sex Offenders and the
New Penology, 4 PSYCH. PUB. POL'Y & L. 452, 452 (1998) ("Recent laws aimed at
addressing sex offenders reflect a transformation in the penal process that has
been called the 'new penology.' This new penology sees crime as a problem of
managing high-risk categories and subpopulations ....").
94. Just deserts, by their very nature, apply to a person who has committed
a wrong, not someone who may, but has not yet, committed a wrong. One could
possibly imagine a deontological theory premising immorality on merely
"thinking bad thoughts." In other words, it is culpable to contemplate future
wrongs. The problem is that incapacitation theory does not necessarily premise
punishment on thinking about committing bad acts, but rather on the person's
empirical probability of committing future bad acts, as derived from an exami-
nation of his or her past behavior and other character traits. Moreover, even if
thinking certain thoughts are morally culpable acts in themselves, a deontolo-
gist would have a hard time justifying the application of corporal punishment to
those acts because of fairness and proportionality concerns.
95. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C § 3142(e) (2003) ("Detention.-If, after a hearing
pursuant to the provisions of subsection (f) of this section, the judicial officer
finds that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the
appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the
community, such judicial officer shall order the detention of the person before
trial.").
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that part of the function of criminal law is to prevent crimi-
nally inclined people from committing future crimes. When
phrased in terms of "the safety of your children," people's
retributive intuitions move quickly to the side. Successful
tough-on-crime and victim-centered narratives98  have
moved even the highest court to embrace prevention as a
goal of punishment."
96. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(a) (1999) ("If a defendant has two
or more prior felony convictions as defined in subdivision (d) that have been
pled and proved, the term for the current felony conviction shall be an
indeterminate term of life imprisonment....").
97. In Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), the U.S. Supreme Court
explicitly iterated incapacitation of the dangerous as a legitimate exercise of
governmental power:
We have already observed that, under the appropriate circumstances
and when accompanied by proper procedures, incapacitation may be a
legitimate end of the civil law. Accordingly, the Kansas court's
determination that the Act's "overriding concern" was the continued
"segregation of sexually violent offenders" is consistent with our
conclusion that the Act establishes civil proceedings, especially when
that concern is coupled with the State's ancillary goal of providing
treatment to those offenders, if such is possible. While we have upheld
state civil commitment statutes that aim both to incapacitate and to
treat, we have never held that the Constitution prevents a State from
civilly detaining those for whom no treatment is available, but who
nevertheless pose a danger to others.
Id. at 365-66 (citations omitted).
98. The narrative preceeding the adoption of "Megan's Law" is an example.
Jonathan Simon remarks:
One of the most unusual features of Megan's Law is its focus on
information. In the legislative campaign for Megan's Law, this
information logic was framed in populist terms of ineffective elites and
ordinary people forced to grapple with menacing evils. As Maureen
Kanka put the matter in a letter written to the House Judiciary
Committee:
If pedophiles are going to be out on the street where they can
accost our children, then parents have the right to know if they
live on our streets. My daughter Megan would be alive today if I
had known that my neighbor was a twice convicted pedophile. I
had responsibility to protect my daughter. I have always told my
children that I would never let anything happen to them. But I
guess I lied. I could not protect my Megan as she was being
brutally raped and murdered across the street from my home. I
have to live with the fact that she screamed out my name as she
was being murdered.
Simon, supra note 13, at 1140 (quoting Maureen Kanka's Testimony to the
House of Representatives, Judiciary Committee, 1996 WL 117175 (Mar. 7,
1996) (Federal Document Clearing House)).
99. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 346.
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Another interesting consequentialist goal that has
emerged as a thread through the seam of criminal law,
especially with the advent of the victims' rights movement,
is redistribution. By this, I mean not only economic redis-
tribution of funds from the criminal to the victim, °0 but also
emotional redistribution of pain from the victim to the
criminal, which, in victims' rights talk, is often referred to
as "closure."' Ideology embracing redistribution of pain is
evident in many aspects of criminal law and is especially
manifest in the death penalty context:
Assumptions about survivors' need for retribution or vengeance
are often explicitly invoked in legal decision making. The failure to
sentence a particular defendant to death or to a long prison term is
often experienced as a devaluing of the worth of the victim's life,
and thus another infliction of pain upon the victim's family, and
indeed prosecutors explicitly call upon juries to return death
sentences in order to affirm the victims' worth. One implicit
assumption of introducing victim impact statements in capital
cases seems to be that they will make the jury more likel to give a
death sentence to help ease the survivors' evident pain.
In addition, redistribution ideology is reflected in re-
storative justice theory. Restorative justice promotes the
idea that the basis for punishment should be restoring the
victim.' 3 The victim ought to be made whole through the
operation of positive law. While victim restitution and res-
toration is a general goal of restorative justice theory, the
restorative justice ideology does not necessarily prescribe
the exact method of achieving that goal:
100. In addition to formal restitution ordered as part of sentencing, a victim
may apply for and receive money prior to the disposition of a case from victim-
witness assistance funds and after a conviction from victim compensation
funds. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 10602 (2004); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4.1-108 (2001);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4.2-105 (2001) (victim-witness assistance fund); D.C.
CODE §§ 4-501-4-518 (2004) (victim compensation funds).
101. Victims' rights advocates contend that the proper way for victims to
heal is through vengeance and punishment of the defendant. This provides the
victim with "closure." On the flip side, some experts contend that forgiveness
rather than redistribution of pain is the best method of closure. See supra notes
22-23 and accompanying text.
102. Susan Bandes, When Victims Seek Closure: Forgiveness, Vengeance and
the Role of Government, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1599, 1605 (1999-2000).
103. See generally Kathy Elton & Michelle M. Roybal, Restoration, A
Component of Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 43 passim (2003).
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Restorative justice focuses on the injuries caused by and needs
resulting from crime and acknowledges that effects of criminal
acts reverberate beyond the victim and offender to the victim's
families and friends, and the community [as] a whole.... [W]hile
[restorative justice] places central emphasis on victim needs and
the requirement that offenders are held accountable to victims, the
restorative justice paradigm also responds to the mutual
powerlessness of offenders and victims in the current system ....
The restorative approach includes the victim in the justice process,
and at the same time takes into account the needs of the offender.
The community's role in restorative justice is to offer the offender
the opportunity to 'make things right.' This may include the
offenders performing community service, paying restitution to the
victim, and/or participating in counseling to help increase their
competencies.
Thus, redistribution theory, as evidenced by the re-
storative justice movement, justifies punishment not on the
basis of fault or blame, but rather on the basis of restoring
the injured party (or the person designated the victim) to a
pre-crime state of affairs, or at least a better state of affairs.
Proponents note that as a secondary effect of restorative
justice policies, the offender is benefited because she is
given the op portunity to distribute emotional well-being to
the victim.
Redistribution theory, which is a consequentialist con-
cept,' ° could go far in explaining why harmful criminal acts
are punished in the absence of intent (strict liability crimes
104. Id. at 50-51 (quoting Anne McDiarmid, Restorative Justice Principles in
Dakota County Community Corrections, 3 CRIME VICTIMS REP., (Mar./Apr. 1999,
at 1)).
105. Inherent in this idea is that the offender benefits from being able to
help the victim. Those who argue that the offender benefits from being in jail
and reflecting on his crime employ similar reasoning. While semantically easy
to characterize certain punishments as "beneficial" to the defendant (and thus
not really punishment at all), most defendants sitting in jail or compelled into
restitution would likely disagree.
106. The theory is consequentialist because it is geared toward a certain
result, namely the restoration of the victim. Consequently, measures that re-
store the victim are a means to an end. This is inconsistent with deontological
thought. My contention is that there is a de facto redistributive strain through-
out criminal jurisprudence, though not explicitly recognized. The redistributive
goals, however, explain many of the more confounding practices in criminal law.
While redistribution may offer explanations as to why the criminal law takes on
the form it does, the theory itself must be further justified. In other words, at
some point there must be an analysis of whether the criminal law should serve
redistributive goals. I hope to develop this analysis in the future.
464 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52
like felony murder), in the presence of very little intent
(negligence crimes), or where causation is tenuous. °7 In
such cases, as critics point out, the retributive value of
punishment is little as moral culpability generally attaches
to intentional acts.!b8 The deterrent value is also question-
able, as it is difficult to give people incentive not to do that
which they never intended to do. 09 What is a tangible result
107. Redistribution, in theory, could possibly explain the preclusion of con-
tributory negligence as a defense to negligent homicide. See, e.g., State v.
Scribner, 805 A.2d 812 (Conn. App. 2002) (disallowing a contributory negligence
defense to vehicular manslaughter). A retribution problem arises because there
is a real question whether a negligent defendant deserves punishment for
murder, especially when harmless negligent driving is not sanctioned crimi-
nally. As for deterrence, it is unlikely that the defendant is a person likely to
commit future crimes, especially if the death was partially caused by the dece-
dent's negligence. Perhaps, the measure deters negligent driving in general. In
that case, it would be an unfair way of deterring negligent driving (giving long
jail sentences to those who happen to cause a harm through their negligence).
In addition, the deterrence question is tricky because there is no evidence that
these criminal rules deter negligent driving generally. Moreover, in the case of
the negligent victim, the wrongfulness of both parties is arguably equal-they
both engaged in wrongfully risky behavior that caused a bad consequence
(namely the victim's death). What separates the victim from the defendant,
however, is that the victim (and his family) suffers all the pain and loss. Redis-
tributionist principles could justify bringing some pain into the defendant's life,
thereby reducing pain (by creating closure) for the family.
108. This does, however, in some part depend on how one identifies those
who deserve to be punished. One might argue that only intentional (or in Model
Penal Code phraseology, "purposeful or knowing") wrongdoers deserve punish-
ment. Another, however, may argue that recklessness as a mental state is
equally as deontologically culpable. The Supreme Court has opined that those
exhibiting reckless indifference to human life, just as those with a specific
intent to kill, deserve the ultimate punishment:
[T]he reckless disregard for human life implicit in knowingly engaging
in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death represents a
highly culpable mental state, a mental state that may be taken into
account in making a capital sentencing judgment when that conduct
causes its natural, though also not inevitable, lethal result.
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157-58 (1987).
109. Jeremy Bentham opines, "Punishments are inefficacious when directed
against individuals who could not know the law, who have acted without
intention, who have done the evil innocently, under an erroneous supposition, or
by irresistible constrains." BENTHAM, supra note 75, at 37 (emphasis added).
One might argue, however, that although the defendant of a strict liability or
negligence crime is not necessarily deterred, strict liability and negligence
crimes encourage potential defendants to take more precautions, thus deterring
them from committing future harms. This rationale is advanced in justification
of punishment for strict liability "violations" or welfare/regulatory offenses:
The rationale of strict liability in public welfare statutes is that
violation of the public interest is more likely to be prevented by
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of the punishment in such cases is that the victim, who suf-
fers the harm, is arguably "restored" from the defendant's
later suffering.11 ° The reason strict liability or negligent
crimes are punished is not to reflect the blameworthiness of
the defendant, but rather to put both the innocent-inten-
tioned defendant and innocent victim on more equal footing
in terms of pain and harm. Redistribution theory also can
explain the divide between attempts and completed
crimes."' When a criminal completes a crime, the victim
(and/or the family) suffers emotional and physical pain,
which itself can be tempered by imposing subsequent pun-
ishment on the defendant. The victim thereby receives
closure, and the pain is more equally distributed (assuming,
as victims' rights proponents often do, that imposing pain
on the defendant lessens the victims' pain).12 When a
criminal attempts but fails to complete a crime, there is of-
ten no victim, and thus punishment (or a severe degree of
punishment) cannot be justified by reference to redistribu-
tive principles."3
unconditional liability than by liability that can be defeated by some
kind of excuse; that even though liability without "fault" is severe, it is
one of the known risks incurred by businessmen; and besides, the
sanctions are only fines, hence, not really "punitive" in character.
FEINBERG, supra note 51, at 111. As Feinberg points, out, however, this ration-
ale is not without risks to justice:
Two things are morally wrong: (1) to condemn a faultless man while
inflicting pain or deprivation on him however slight (unjust
punishment); and (2) to inflict unnecessary and severe suffering on a
faultless man even in the absence of condemnation (unjust civil
penalty).
Id. at 113.
110. See supra note 24 and accompanying text for Justice O'Connor's
discussion of the restorative goal of the criminal prosecution in the context of
victim impact statements.
111. The operative difference is that in the case of attempts there is no pain
and loss to redistribute and no closure to give to the victim and/or her family.
112. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
victims' rights movement and closure.
113. This may provide an answer to the challenging query as to why at-
tempts should be separated from completed crimes. The argument against dis-
parate treatment of attempts and completed crimes is that there is nothing
ontologically signifioant separating a shooter who misses by a fraction of an
inch from a shooter who kills. Joel Feinberg observes:
The difference in the sentences inflicted on two persons whose criminal
wrongdoing was the same and whose degree of moral blameworthiness
was identical seems to indicate that the legal system which
countenanced it is not committed to the principle of proportionality,
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Proponents of victims' rights would argue that restora-
tion, redistribution, and closure are legitimate and expedi-
ent goals of criminal punishment,1 1 4 but many would dis-
agree.'15 Restorative justice concepts may conflict both with
retributive and deterrence theories of juridical punishment.
A retributivist would regard any justification of punishment
that finds its origin outside of concepts of fault, blame, and
desert highly offensive.11 A deterrence theorist would reject
restorative programs that do not maximally discourage
criminal activity."' In addition, there are more general ar-
guments against law as a mechanism of redistribution.
which requires that the severity of the punishment be proportional to
the moral blameworthiness of the offense. In these examples the moral
blameworthiness of criminals is identical, yet the punishment is much
more severe in the one case than in the other. Unless there is some
reasonable explanation for this discrepancy, the sentences seem to be
more arbitrary than rational, the difference between the fates of A, and
A2 being determined not by their deserts but by luck, plain and simple.
Joel Feinberg, Equal Punishment for Failed Attempts: Some Bad but Instructive
Arguments Against It, 37 ARIz. L. REV. 117, 118 (1995). A possible reason for the
disparity may lie in an alternate way of looking at criminal law, a very utili-
tarian way. Criminal sanctions should account for the immorality of the crimi-
nal act. Where two equally culpable shooters shoot the gun, but only one kills,
both were equally immoral. One might argue, however, that criminal law
should not only punish culpable actors but also restore the harmed party.
Where there is no harm, there is no need for restoration. Thus, depending on
the harm that actually resulted, even through the operation of luck factors,
there may be a need for a higher sanction for restorative purposes.
114. See supra notes 22, 24 and accompanying text.
115. Where Kant would object philosophically, those who think that venge-
ance is not closure would object empirically. See Henderson, supra note 9, at
593-94.
116. Robinson, supra note 45, at 380 ("Restorative processes can provide
some wonderful benefits, but they can also create serious injustices and failures
of justice if used in a way that systematically conflicts with doing justice-
where offenders are given more punishment, or less punishment, than their
wrongdoing deserves."). Joel Feinberg explains the disconnect between compen-
sation and desert:
[W]here compensation is not the redressing of injury and, hence, where
it lacks the character of the mandatory repayment of a debt, desert is
nonpolar. Either the suffering innocent deserve aid and succor or they
do not, and that is the end of the matter. When the moral equilibrium
is not unbalanced, there is no compensatory analogue of deserved
punishment.
FEINBERG, supra note 51, at 75.
117. Robinson, supra note 45, at 382-83 ("For crime control utilitarians, do-
ing justice has traditionally been thought of as suboptimal in reducing crime, or
at least as less effective than the mechanisms of deterrence and incapacita-
tion.").
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Most of the debate concerning the propriety of the law as a
redistributor of goods understandably occurs with reference
to tort law, that is, at the private law level:
An ongoing debate in private law scholarship revolves around the
legitimacy, desirability, feasibility, and expediency of trying to
promote distributive goals through private law rules.... The main
arguments against private-law-induced redistribution are: (1) the
lack of predictability and expediency of such a redistribution; (2)
the incompatibility of the distributive goals with other goals of
private law; (3) the excessive intrusiveness on individual liberty
caused by such a redistribution relative to alternative distributive
mechanisms; (4) the lack of judicial accountability; and (5) the
unfairness of redistribution by private law mechanisms due to the
random nature of that distribution, namely, in the partiality of
both its participants and results. 118
While these arguments apply to private law, they are
instructive in the criminal law context. If tort law is
unequipped to redistribute wealth, one is hard pressed to
imagine how criminal law judges are equipped to redistrib-
ute pain and manage closure, which are extremely nebulous
psychological concepts. Moreover, if the distribution of
wealth through the tort system is unfair because of the
unevenness of the participation of litigants in tort suits,
redistribution is certainly unfair in the criminal law context
given the multitude of permissible and impermissible fac-
tors that go into any given prosecution and sentencing. The
most cogent argument, however, is that the entire business
of redistribution and closure makes sentencing not so much
a function of the immorality of the defendant, but rather a
function of attendant attributes of the victim of which the
defendant may have been completely unaware. '19 Conse-
quently, although redistribution may underlie some con-
118. Tsachi Keren-Paz, An Inquiry into the Merits of Redistribution through
Tort Law: Rejecting the Claim of Randomness, 16 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 91 (2003).
119. Supreme Court law, since overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S.
808 (1991), held victim impact evidence to be a violation of the Eighth
Amendment precisely because it resulted in punishment based on victim
attributes of which the defendant could have been totally unaware:
The focus of a VIS [victim impact statement], however, is not on the
defendant, but on the character and reputation of the victim and the
effect on his family. These factors may be wholly unrelated to the
blameworthiness of a particular defendant. As our cases have shown,
the defendant often will not know the victim, and therefore will have
2004] 467
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cepts of criminal punishment, it may ultimately reduce to
little more than ideology grounded less in morality and
more in the political power of the victims' rights movement.
C. Hybrid Theories of Punishment
The final justification of punishment addressed by this
article is difficult to characterize as purely deontological or
purely consequentialist in nature. Expressionism, as for-
mulated by Joel Feinberg in "Doing and Deserving,"2 ° is the
idea that criminal law possesses a unique quality of allow-
ing the punishing authority, or those in whose name it acts
to express symbolic condemnation for the act punished.121
Feinberg lays out several manifestations of this symbolic
condemnation: (1) Authoritative disavowal, where the pun-
ishing authority d isavows a criminal act of its agent or
citizen, 12 (2) symbolic nonacquiescence, where the punish-
ing authority goes on record against an act previously
accepted so as to testify to the recognition of its wrongful-
ness, 1 23 (3) vindication of the law, where the punishing
authority gives meaning to existing statutes by enforcing
them,'24 and (4) absolution of others, where the punishing
no knowledge about the existence or characteristics of the victim's
family.
Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 504 (1987).
120. FEINBERG, supra note 51, at 98-118.
121. Id. at 98. Thus, "[plunishment, in short, has a symbolic significance
largely missing from other kinds of penalties." Id.
122. Id. at 101-02. Feinberg uses the example of an "airplane of nation A
[that] fires on an airplane of nation B while the latter is flying over
international waters. Punishing the pilot is an emphatic, dramatic, and well-
understood way of condemning and thereby disavowing his act .... It testifies
thereby to government A's recognition of the violated rights of government B in
the affected area and, therefore, to the wrongfulness of the pilot's act." Id. at
101-02.
123. Id. at 102-03. Feinberg here uses the example of condemning paramour
killings, which were once legal in the State of Texas. He states, "The demand
for punishment in cases of this sort may instead represent the feeling that the
paramour killings deserve to be condemned, that the law in condoning, even
approving of them, speaks for all citizens in expressing a wholly in appropriate
attitude toward them." Id. at 103.
124. Id. at 104. Feinberg explains, "A statute honored mainly in the breach
begins to lose its character as law, unless, as we say, it is vindicated (emphati-
cally reaffirmed); and clearly the way to do this (indeed the only way) is to
punish those who violate it." Id.
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authority absolves innocent suspects of blame by punishing
the single guilty party.
12
1
This theory, it can be argued, is distinct from purely
consequentialist theories because it recognizes the condem-
natory purpose of criminal law aside from any maximizing
of utility in society. Feinberg states, "Symbolic public con-
demnation added to deprivation may help or hinder
deterrence, reform, and rehabilitation-the evidence is not
clear."'26 Expressivism, however, is extremely difficult to
characterize as purely deontological because the punished
person is used as a means to the end of the various con-
demnatory purposes elaborated by Feinberg.' In other
words, the criminal, under the expressivist theory, is pun-
ished not necessarily because he deserves it, but rather
because, for example in the context of "absolution of others,"
it absolves other innocent suspects of blame.2 8 In addition,
it seems difficult to conceptualize the desirability of the
condemnation apart from the consequences of the condem-
nation, whether it be better international relations, a more
satisfied populace, innocent suspects' lives improved, or a
more strongly revered criminal code.129
Like retributivism, expressivism fails to answer the
important question, "What acts ought the punishing
authority condemn?" 3 ' Through his examples, Feinberg
makes assumptions about the bases of the penal system
apart from its expressivist function, namely, that there is
an alternate way of determining what ought to be pun-
125. Id. at 105. Feinberg argues, "when something scandalous has occurred
and it is clear that the wrongdoer must be one of a small number of suspects,
then the state, by punishing one of these parties, thereby relieves the others of
suspicion and informally absolves them of blame." Id.
126. Id. at 101.
127. Retributivist theory counsels that man may never be used as a means
to an ends. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 125.
129. Michael C. Harper characterizes the expressivist function of law as
follows:
A central function of the criminal law is to iterate the community's
condemnation of certain behavior and associated mental states in a
way that helps insure that the tendencies in all of us toward these
behaviors and emotions can be internally controlled by a stem
superego if not by a more integrated ego.
Michael Harper, Comment on the Tort Crime Distinction: A Generation Later,
76 B.U. L. Rev. 23, 25 (1996).
130. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
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ished.3 To explain symbolic nonacquiescence, Feinberg
uses the example of a Texas law that not only excused but
justified paramour killings. He states, "The demand that
paramour killings be punished may simply be the demand
that this lopsided value judgment be withdrawn and that
the state go on record against paramour killings and the
law testify to the recognition that such killings are wrong-
ful."13 2 Here there is a presupposition of the definition of
"wrongful," although it is not apparent what it is."3 It is
unclear whether Feinberg thinks the punishing authority
ought to condemn that which the people largely condemn,"'
or ought to condemn that which the people may not largely
condemn but should condemn.3 5 Likewise, the authoritative
disavowal function takes for granted a prior moral calcula-
tion as to which acts should or should not be authoritatively
disavowed.'36 Moreover, in the context of "vindication of the
law," expressivism takes on an explicitly positivistic tone.37
The precise function of punishment is to make laws have
effect. Consequently, the reason a state punishes an actor is
to give voice to laws that already exist.3 8 This concept
clearly does not speak to the more fundamental question of
why particular laws should or should not exist.
Even more unclear is the question of whether expres-
sivism is itself a ground for criminal punishment or if
expression is merely an ancillary aspect of the government's
131. Ultimately then, saying that what ought be punished is that which the
punishing authority ought to condemn is as unsatisfying as saying that what
ought be punished is that which deserves to be punished. Both statements beg
the further question of what ought to be punished or condemned. This leads
back to the impenetrable problem of first principles. See supra note 61.
132. FEINBERG, supra note 51, at 103.
133. What is clear is that Feinberg thinks that paramour killings are wrong.
What is unclear is why they are wrong.
134. This position, in effect, reduces expressivism to majoritarianism. For
this precise reason, positivists reject the attempt to employ theory as the
ultimate justifying mechanism. See supra note 52.
135. This view may solve the "naturalistic fallacy," which is concerned with
deriving 'ought' from 'is'. See Robert P. George, Kelsen and Aquinas on "The
Natural-Law Doctrine", 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1625, 1632 (1999-2002). How-
ever, it leads one back to the problem of first principles. See supra note 61.
136. Feinberg's airplane shooting example assumes either: (1) shooting an-
other country's plane over international waters is bad and should thus be
disavowed; and/or (2) complying with international demands is valuable and
authoritative disavowal helps countries achieve compliance. See supra note 122.
137. See supra notes 51-52 for a discussion of positivism.
138. See supra note 124.
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execution of penal laws based on other philosophical
grounds.'39 Does Feinberg advocate that the primary pur-
pose of punishment should be the expression of condemna-
tion? If so, this idea appears to lead to some problematic
results. For example, if the main purpose of punishment is
authoritative disavowal, it could be argued that that the
state is justified in punishing high profile criminal defen-
dants more than other criminal defendants. 4 ' If the purpose
is vindication of the law, one could say the state would be
justified in punishing large numbers of offenders quickly
and perhaps without proper regard for actual innocence or
procedural safeguards in order to show society that the law
has effect.
141
The other alternative is that Feinberg is saying that the
State ought to punish for reasons apart from mere expres-
sion (either deontological or consequential), but when it
punishes, it also serves an expressionist function. In all
fairness, it appears that Feinberg does not believe that
expressivist functions underlie the entire purpose of pun-
ishment. Rather, he argues that the expressive function of
the law is an aspect that must be included in any philo-
sophical account of punishment:
139. The question is: Has Feinberg argued that authoritative disavowal is
the ground for erecting a system of punishment or that there are certain core
values the punishing authority should support through authoritative disavowal.
140. Recent months have seen the conviction of Winona Ryder for multiple
felonies related to a single incidence of shoplifting and the conviction of Martha
Stewart for conspiracy. Many have speculated that the aggressive nature of
these prosecutions was to "make an example" of Winona and Martha, a tactic
that is troubling to much of the public. See, e.g., Recap of June 14, 2003:
Jailhouse Stocks? (June 16, 2003) (statement by Gregg Hymowitz), available at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,89512,00.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2003)
("My concern is maybe we're going a little too far. Some of these charges against
Martha Stewart are a little bit ridiculous. And to take a celebrity and try and
make an example of them bothers me."). Id.
141. The so-called "war on drugs" included aggressive policing and
prosecution policies to make drug laws resonate more strongly among members
of the American public. Aggressive policies resulted not only in miscarriages of
justice in individual cases, but also broader racially unjust policies:
Although the drug war has certainly sought to eradicate controlled
substances and destroy the networks established for their distribution,
this is only part of the story. As I shall explain, state efforts to control
drugs are also a way for dominant groups to express racial power.
Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why the




A philosophical theory of punishment that, through inadequate
definition, leaves out the condemnatory function not only will
disappoint the moralist and the traditional moral philosopher; it
will seem offensively irrelevant as well to the constitutional
lawyer, whose vital concern with punishment is both conceptual,
and therefore genuinely philosophical, as well as practically
urgent. 142
To sum up, the foregoing discussion is meant to sketch
out the broad categories of penal philosophy existing in the
discourse of criminal law and victims' rights. In their most
basic forms, deontological and consequentialist theories are
mutually exclusive. If one is a pure deontologist, she may
not justify a doctrine by its tendency to produce good. If one
is a pure utilitarian, she may only justify a doctrine by its
tendency to produce good. The consequentialist criticism of
deontology is that the concept of just deserts, when divorced
from the empirical world, rings hollow. The purely deon-
tological derivation of right and wrong seems truly arbi-
trary. Conversely, the deontological objection to utilitari-
anism is that using any means to achieve a good end is
unfair and that relying on future results is speculative.
The question is: Are consequentialist and deontological
theories forever locked in an uncompromisin4 battle for jus-
tificatory superiority in the criminal law? I think the
answer is "no." Where deontological theories may fail to
provide a mechanism for determining to which specific acts
moral culpability should ultimately attach,"' utilitarian
concepts (as well as other procedural concepts like democ-
racy) can provide that ability. 145 For example, the decision to
protect people's private investments over corporate discre-
tion because doing so is best for the economy, gives the law
a way to determine the moral culpability of certain forms of
142. FEINBERG, supra note 51, at 105.
143. See Hurd, supra note 65; see also Christopher, supra note 46, at 855
(indicating that "the modern debate over the justification of punishment stems
largely from the impasse between retributivism and some form of consequen-
tialism").
144. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
145. The legal positivist model says that we should look no further than the
express statements of the law to determine what ought to be punished. See
supra note 61. The procedural value model, like valuing democracy, is similar to
legal positivism, but it adds one more level of abstraction: The positive law dic-
tates what constitutes the "good," but only when the positive law has been
achieved through moral means like the democratic process.
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corporate risk-taking.'46 These types of consequentialist
choices shape the actual doctrine of criminal law. 147 The
deontological values emerge to restrain the consequentialist
from using any means to affect the desired goal. For exam-
ple, once consequentialist thought is utilized to determine a
certain corporate act to be illegal, deontological principles
enter to prevent the law from, say, imprisoning the guilty
corporate executive for life. 148 This is because life imprison-
ment would exceed the bounds of the punishment "de-
served" by the illegal actor.'49
As a result, there should exist, and in fact does exist in
the law, a delicate balance between deontological and
consequentialist concerns. Where the balance cannot be
maintained, for example in areas where fairness and utility
necessarily conflict, there will always be a sense of unease
about where to draw the line. This article, however, does
not claim to answer where the line between deontology and
teleology should be drawn. My project here is to respond to
what I anticipate to be the potential criticisms of the non-
specific victim liability from both camps of philosophy. Part
II addresses the deontological criticism of the defense, and
Part III responds to consequentialist concerns with the
defense.
146. Thus, with the goal of achieving a certain state of affairs in society,
namely, protection of the investor, legislatures are guided in this area of crimi-
nal law. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat.
745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.) ("An Act to
protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclo-
sures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes.").
147. They give the positivist a mechanism for determining why the legisla-
ture acted the way it did, and the theorist fuel to voice the opinion that the
legislature ought to act in a certain way.
148. See Katz, supra note 67, at 307.
149. Again this may beg the question of how much punishment is deserved
by any given criminal act. Undeniably, however, retributivism must encompass,
at some level, an idea of proportionality, however defined:
Though retributivism's rationale for the proportionality principle is
undoubtedly thin (and perhaps nonexistent), that punishment should
be in some way proportional to the crime is an intuition (like the wrong
of punishing the innocent) that is so widely shared as to make its
attack unpersuasive.
Christopher, supra note 46, at 891-92. Embedded within Christopher's criticism
of retributive proportionality is an underlying question regarding deontological
limiting principles: Why does retributivism require punishment to be fair and
proportional? The easy, albeit perhaps unsatisfying, answer is: Because that is
precisely what it means to give someone what they "deserve."
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II. RESPONDING TO THE DEONTOLOGICAL OBJECTION
A. The Deontological Objection
Deontologists, and retributivists in particular, are pre-
occupied with the concept of just deserts. As a result, a
retributivist looking at the nonspecific victim liability de-
fense could argue that the defense does not correctly mete
out punishment on the basis of desert. In other words, the
defense either exculpates those who deserve to be punished,
punishes those who deserve to be exculpated, or both.
Whether in the name of promoting efficiency, controlling
crime, or just by happenstance, if the nonspecific victim
liability defense does not punish those who deserve pun-
ishment because they deserve it then the defense has failed
from a retributivist perspective. 
5
The easy initial response to the deontologist is that the
nonspecific victim liability defense does capture what it
means to "deserve" punishment. The proponent can argue
that as with self-defense, the nonspecific victim liability de-
fense dictates that under the specified conditions"' the
defendant is not morally culpable (or as morally culpable as
a defendant who does not meet the conditions). Conse-
quently, the parameters of the nonspecific victim liability
defense become the moral meters with which to measure
the blameworthiness of the defendant. The nonspecific vic-
tim liability defense is thereby incorporated into the defini-
tion of what it means to "deserve" punishment.'52 A defen-
dant who meets the requirements of the defense simply
does not deserve to suffer criminal sanctions (or as severe
criminal sanctions).
This response, however, may seem completely unsatis-
fying. Basically, it is the tautological assertion that the
150. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing retributivist
theory).
151. See Gruber supra note 14, at Part IV.
152. This definitional move, that is, defining justice with reference to the
victim liability defense, is not without criticism. H.L.A. Hart objects to the ten-
dency to define punishment in terms of its justification, as a "definitional stop,"
which defines away the problem of justification. HART, supra note 51, at 4-5. My
response is that the very nature of deontology makes definitional reasoning un-
avoidable. Having been prevented from appealing to anything experiential, see
supra text accompanying note 62, the only way to fit a specific punishment into
a retributive framework is by a priori definition.
474 [Vol. 52
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victim liability defense defines what it means to act culpa-
bly or nonculpably and thus desert is determined with
reference to the defense. Like the criticism of deontology in
general, the criticism of this response is that the assertion
that the nonspecific victim liability defense captures the
meaning of morality is an arbitrary assertion.'53 The impor-"
tant question that must be addressed in order to show that
the victim liability defense comports with just deserts is:
Why do the elements of the defense enumerated in the
Introduction define the parameters of just desert? In an-
swering this question, one must determine which acts and
actors are excluded from the protective ambit of the defense
and why.
While the defense is premised on "wrongful" victim con-
duct,1 4 an issue arises as to whether "wrongful" conduct
should be interpreted expansively to include negligent vic-
tim conduct. One could look to tort law and craft a criminal
victim liability doctrine similar to contributory or compara-
tive negligence. 11 5 By doing so, however, the nonspecific
victim liability defense runs the risk of taking on the char-
acteristics of a doctrine that exculpates rapists when the
victim has dressed provocatively, or exculpates muggers
when the victim has jogged in the park alone. Such a doc-
trine would appear to fly in the face of retributive concerns
over just deserts.
Consequently, the powerful deontological criticism of
the victim liability defense is that it fails to comport with
just deserts because of its potential to create a regime in
which crime victims are blamed for their own imprudence
and culpable criminals are let off the hook. This is one of
the most significant criticisms of the proposed nonspecific
victim liability defense. The fear is that immoral criminals
who prey on the weak, ignorant, or careless will be re-
warded with reduced liability. Specifically, the defense
could give license to blame battered women for staying in
153. The argument is that deontological first principles are either arbitrary
or ultimately consequentialist in nature. See supra notes 59-64 and accompa-
nying text.
154. This is the first requirement of the defense. For further explanation of
the wrongfulness requirement, see Gruber, supra note 14, at 710-14.
155. See, e.g., Alon Harel, Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law: The
Case for a Criminal Law Principle of Comparative Fault, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1181




abusive relationships, blame mugging victims for walking
down dark alleys alone, and blame rape victims for "asking
for it.""5 6 Indeed, this author has condemned the tendency to
insert contributory negligence and assumption of risk prin-
.ciples into the rape trial:
[Tihe foremost legal error in the rape trial [is] the "widespread
bootlegging of the tort concepts of contributory negligence and
assumption of the risk into the working law of rape." The
importation of tort-type defenses into the rape trial is a legal flaw
within the trial process that calls for a legal solution. 15'
Below is an analysis of the potential responses to the
deontological objection.
B. Response 1: The Consequentialist Benefits of
Contributory Negligence in Criminal Law Outweigh the
Deontological Harms
One way to respond to the deontological criticism is by
arguing that the consequentialist benefits of victim blaming
outweigh any concerns over just deserts. At least one theo-
rist, Professor Alon Harel, has argued that the criminal law
should incorporate a contributory negligence or comparative
fault type defense premised on victims placing themselves
in unreasonably vulnerable positions regarding the risk of
being victimized.1 58 He purports to extend "Coasian insight
from tort law into criminal law."'59 Harel advocates con-
tributory negligence rules in criminal law to encourage
potential victims to take precautions, thereby creating posi-
tive externalities:
Precautions taken by victims provide two types of positive
externalities. The first directly benefits potential victims by
making crime less profitable; the second benefits the population at
156. These are the horror stories that victim blaming brings to mind. See
Gruber, supra note 14, at 645.
157. Aya Gruber, Pink Elephants in the Rape Trial: The Problem of Tort-
Type Defenses in the Criminal Law of Rape, 4 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 203,
211 (1997) (quoting Terri Villa-McDowell, Privacy and the Rape Victim: The
Inconsistent Treatment of Privacy Interests in Two Recent Supreme Court Cases,
2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 293, 327 (1992) (footnote omitted).
158. See Harel, supra note 155 passim.
159. Id. at 1188.
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large by reducing the indirect costs of crime, in particular, the
costs of the enforcement system.
16
0
There are, however, several problems with responding
to the deontological criticism by asserting solely a conse-
quentialist account of victim-blaming. First, economic
analysis of criminal law is a specific subset of a utilitarian
or consequentialist penal theory 6 ' and is thus subject to the
empirical criticism of consequentialism.'6' Harel's theory is
necessarily a theory that justifies, or at least explains,
punishment on the basis of outcomes. Thus, the success of
the theory depends on uncertain contingent results. 163 One
could certainly argue that to the extent that economics mat-
ter, allowing a negligence defense to intentional crimes does
not necessarily produce the most efficient outcomes:
[A] contributory negligence rule in criminal law may create
incentives for criminals to commit crimes against careless people
.... [Tihere is enough crime to go around. Smart criminals still
have incentives to rob wealthy people with alarm systems. The
deterrence effect of criminal penalties to the dumb criminal who
would likely get caught and punished, however, is all but lost.
Harel does not take into account the incentive effect such a rule
would have on people who, otherwise, would have been too scared
to rob at all. Also, with more crimes against careless people
without security systems (who are probably, on average, poorer),
criminals will get less compensation for each crime. This, in turn,
may increase the number of crimes thieves commit in order to
steal the same amount.'6
Of course, currently there is no formal criminal defense
that lessens the defendant's liability when the victim has
160. Id. at 1195-96.
161. Economic analysis counsels that the "correct" law is one that maxi-
mizes efficiency and minimizes inefficiency. Efficiency is generally measured in
terms of wealth. Thus, law ought to be geared to maximizing wealth and mini-
mizing costs.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 74-76.
163. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
164. Gruber, supra note 157, at 243. Harel also recognizes the possibility of
"displacement" crimes, but argues that "[d]isplacement of crime, however, can
hardly justify the rejection of a criminal law principle of comparative fault."
Harel, supra note 155, at 1200.
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been careless.'65 As a result, there is no way to determine in
any quantifiable manner whether contributory negligence
increases or decreases crime or increases or decreases vic-
tim precaution. The criticism posited above is that a
comparative negligence principle in criminal law will, in
fact, lead to more crime because it would encourage crimi-
nals to prey on the poor. In turn, criminals will need to
commit more crimes for the same gain. Harel, on the other
hand, articulates positive consequences of shifting crime to
the poor:
[B]etter precautions taken by potential victims in an affluent
neighborhood may force criminals to turn their attention to less
affluent neighborhoods and subsequently may persuade them to
leave criminal activity altogether and choose instead le 6al
substitutes, or at least to choose to commit 
a less serious crime.
One could debate endlessly whether, as a result of a
contributory negligence defense, the criminal will turn to
more or less crime. This debate, however, illuminates the
basic criticism of justifying criminal punishment by effi-
ciency: It can only be a contingent reason for punishment
and carries little prospective justificatory force.16' In addi-
tion, some empirical evidence exists to support the conten-
tion that a contributory negligence defense would lead to
greater inefficiency. There is somewhat of a historical ana-
log to criminal contributory negligence. Tort-type reasoning
has occurred informally in the rape context.1 8 -Jurors have
acquitted defendants, not because the victim consented to
the sex, but rather because she "negligently" put herself in
the position of being a victim of rape. Rape theorists con-
tend that such practices have led to under-enforcement of
rape laws. 69 Assuming the validity of consequentialist
165. While there is no formal contributory negligence defense in criminal
law, the assessment of victim liability is significantly present throughout the
criminal process. See Gruber, supra note 14, at 692-93.
166. Harel, supra note 155, at 1200.
167. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text (discussing empirical
problems with utilitarianism).
168. See Gruber, supra note 157, at 212 (section entitled "The Pervasiveness
of Tort Defense in Rape Law"), describing the formal and informal ways in
which the criminal law of rape blames rape victims for imprudence.
169. Kathryn Carney, Rape: The Paradigmatic Hate Crime, 75 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 315, 346 (2001):
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deterrence theory,"' under-enforcement of criminal laws
leads to more crimes, which is inefficient.
In addition, the theory is vulnerable to the criticism
that it is at odds with common fairness sentiments about
criminal punishment.171 Contributory negligence in criminal
law seems unfair and disproportional for several reasons.
Moreover, any deontological account of criminal contribu-
tory negligence has unpalatable social implications. Similar
to Professor Harel, Judge Richard Posner has offered an
account of criminal law based on transaction costs:
The major function of criminal law in a capitalist society is to
prevent people from bypassing the system of voluntary,
compensated exchange-the "market," explicit or implicit-in
situations where, because transaction costs are low, the market is
a more efficient method of allocating resources than forced
exchange.
Critics contend that such an economic model is unable
to characterize adequately or correctly why we have crimi-
nal prohibitions. Posner's economic explanation of rape
prohibitions as reducing potential victims' cost of self-
protection and potential defendants' cost of overcoming
those protections is particularly troubling to Professor
Mark Tunick:
Posner realizes how perverse his argument sounds and at least
pauses to acknowledge that of course "rape is a bad thing." He
[R]ape is characterized by significant underreporting. This is
attributed to the fact that rape victims feel that the police either could
not or would not help them. The victims attribute this distrust to the
fact that they often suffer a second time at the hands of an insensitive
and gender-biased criminal justice system and because of social beliefs
at large. Rape victims are correct in their perception. Studies have
shown the prevalence of judicial bias against rape victims. The victim
is often the one put on trial, with jurors focusing on extraneous factors
like their clothing, lifestyle and demeanor. Additionally, studies of jury
behavior and attitude reveal poorly disguised hostility toward rape
victims, whom juries view as bringing the rape upon themselves ....
170. Deterrence theory posits that the purpose of punishment is to affect the
criminal's "calculation of the chances for and against" success. BENTHAM, supra
note 75, at 38.
171. In other words, creating criminal policies to maximize market effi-
ciency could employ unfair means. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying
text.
172. Richard Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 1193, 1195 (1985).
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says his point is that "economic analysis need not break down in
the force of such apparently noneconomic phenomena as rape." At
this point his argument is far removed from not only a justification
but also an explanation of some aspects of legal punishment-he
gives a rationale which is not in the least bit persuasive as an
account of the reasons we punish crimes of violence.
173
Professor Harel's theory is limited so that it does not
apply to a woman who has "negligently" placed herself in a
position to be raped. This, limitation, however, is not based
on efficiency. Rather, in the rape context, Harel appeals to a
non-economic, deontological, factor: "Equal protection." '174 In
the end, then, even advocates of contributory negligence
defenses in criminal law appeal to a retributivist check
when it comes to non-economic crimes.
Even outside the rape context, fairness concerns mili-
tate against a contributory negligence defense. Assuming
that it is expedient to punish one criminal less than another
for the same behavior merely because the victim was negli-
gent by, say, not investing in an alarm system, such a prac-
tice resonates as unfair or disproportionate. Even if one
could discern a difference in the moral character of the neg-
ligent and non-negligent victim, " ' one would be hard
pressed to see a difference in the moral character of the
criminals who committed crimes against those victims. In
fact, there is an argument that the state should particularly
protect the "negligent," who may in all likelihood be disad-
vantaged, and particularly punish those who prey on negli-
gent victims:
The criminal law shields victims against their own imprudence.
They are entitled to move in the world at large with as much
freedom as they enjoy behind locked doors. They can walk in the
park when they want, sit where they want in the subway, and
wear skimpy clothes without fearing that they will be faulted for
precipitating rape. This is what it means to be a free person, and
173. MARK TUNICK, PUNISHMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 82 (1992).
174. Harel argues:
Women are more vulnerable to some crimes than men, since they are
more likely to become victims of sexual offenses. Minorities are more
vulnerable to racially based crimes than whites. The equal protection
model should govern the distribution of protection to women and
minorities because their vulnerability is involuntary.
Harel, supra note 155, at 1204.
175. See infra text accompanying notes 200, 216-18.
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the criminal law protects this freedom by not censuring those who
expose themselves, perhaps with less than due care, to risks of
criminal aggression.
The advocate of contributory negligence in criminal law
might respond that any fairness concerns are outweighed
by efficiency gains. This argument relies on a purely non-
retributive account of criminal punishment:
The criminal law principle of comparative fault can . . . be
described as a statement that society cannot afford to protect
legitimate, nonculpable behavior of victims when that behavior is
too costly. Under this interpretation, the victim's culpability is
neither condoned nor deplored. The principle simply reflects the
fact that societal resources are limited and thus should be directed
to the most urgent societal needs. The protection of careless
victims is a particularly costly enterprise and consequently we
may have to sacrifice some of the protection granted to careless
victims. This sacrifice need not imply that the victims' careless
conduct is condemnable nor that the criminals' behavior is less
culpable.
177
A limited cost-based rationale for criminal law, how-
ever, simply fails to strike an intuitively correct balance
between deontology and consequentialism. Relying exclu-
sively on cost as a justification for criminal policies is
problematic because a criminal defense that does not find at
least some ground in deontology will likely not pass
philosophical, popular, or even political muster. For exam-
ple, most people would agree that one who commits an
unexcused murder should be punished; even if statistical
analysis shows that such punishment has absolutely no
deterrent effect, there is no chance the murderer would
reoffend, the victim has no surviving family members who
require closure, and nobody in society-at-large feels person-
ally unsafe because of the murder.178 In contrast, most peo-
ple would have trouble punishing a complete innocent
176. George P. Fletcher, Domination in Wrongdoing, 76 B.U. L. REV. 347,
356 (1996).
177. Harel, supra note 155, at 1228.
178. This sentiment has been expressed exhaustively in the writings of
Kant, supra note 56, at 103 ("Even if a civil society were to dissolve itself by
common agreement of all its members ... the last murderer remaining in
prison must first be executed, so that everyone will duly receive what his
actions are worth.").
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simply to deter crime, satisfy victims, or placate society.179
Therefore, deontology has a very special place in the crimi-
nal law. Paul Robinson describes the special role of deontol-
ogy in the criminal law as one of giving criminal prohibi-
tions credibility, which ultimately furthers both retributive
and consequentialist goals:
There is practical value, not just 'philosophical' value, in
maintaining the criminal law's focus on moral blameworthiness.
What we have in the past taken to be instances of injustice
imposed by the criminal justice system on some individual, when
the just desert principle is violated, we ought to understand now
as instances of injustice imposed on us all, since each such
instance erodes the criminal law's moral credibility and, thus, its
power to protect us all.1
8 0
Consequently, for the foregoing reasons, responding to
the deontological objection to victim liability by asserting
the consequentialist benefits of contributory negligence is
ultimately unsatisfying and unpersuasive.
C. Response 2: A Contributory Negligence Rule in Criminal
Law Does Adequately Reflect a Correct Distribution of
Just Deserts
Another response to the deontological objection is that
the objection "gets" deontology wrong. Importing a contribu-
tory negligence principle into criminal law is consistent
with just deserts because contributory negligence is deon-
tologically culpable.18 As support, the respondent will
contend that contributory negligence and assumption of
risk principles seem fair and correct in tort law because the
179. One might respond that repeat offender laws, three strikes provisions,
and civil commitment of pedophiles punish criminals not solely because they
are guilty of a crime in the past, but also because they are likely to commit
crime in the future. In this sense, the policies punish the "innocent." The coun-
terargument is that even these highly utilitarian laws apply only to those indi-
viduals who have been adjudicated guilty of some past crime. Thus, there is
preserved some sense that the individuals deserve punishment.
180. Robinson, supra note 45, at 499.
181. This statement has two logical implications: (1) a contributorily negli-
gent victim does not "deserve" victims' rights or as many victims' rights, and (2)
a defendant who commits a crime against a contributorily negligent victim does
not "deserve" to be punished or punished to the same extent as other criminals.
[Vol. 52482
2004] RIGHTING VICTIM WRONGS 483
negligent plaintiff does not deserve to recover.'82 Like the
first response, this response also fails because it is unlikely
that contributory negligence will comport with a deontologi-
cal notion of just desert in criminal law, even if it seems fair
in tort law. First, there are striking dissimilarities between
tort law and criminal law that make it the case that a doc-
trine, which seems fair in tort law, will not necessarily be
just in criminal law.
Discerning distinctions between tort and criminal law is
not new. Philosophers and legal scholars have suffered 8 '
over the tort/crime distinction for years, trying, often
unsuccessfully, to fit the complicated doctrines into discreet
categories. Surveying the wealth of comparative literature
on tort and crime, three types of distinctions emerge: (1)
distinctions between the prohibitions involved in tort law
and criminal law (what tort law and criminal law dictate
ought or ought not be done);8 ' (2) distinctions between the
182. Prosser & Keaton describe contributory negligence as follows:
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the plaintiff,
contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls
below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own
protection. Unlike assumption of risk, the defense does not rest upon
the idea that the defendant is relieved of any duty toward the plaintiff.
Rather, although the defendant has violated his duty, has been
negligent, and would otherwise be liable, the plaintiff is denied
recovery because his own conduct disentitles him to maintain the
action. In the eyes of the law both parties are at fault; and the defense
is one of the plaintiffs disability rather than the defendant's innocence.
PROSSER & KEATON ON TORTS CH. 6 § 65.
183. I say "suffered" because of the challenge of distinguishing in a mean-
ingful and coherent way between tort and crime. See Stephen Marks, Utility
and Community: Musings on the Tort/Crime Distinction, 76 B.U. L. REV. 215,
240 (1996) (discussing factors that make "the tort/crime distinction so hard to
define"). Marks observes:
In describing criminal and tortious activity, various scholars have
sought to identify the salient characteristics of activities that fall into
each category. For example, some observers characterize crimes as
intentional, serious, and not requiring actual harm. Conversely, torts
are not so serious, do not require intent, and require harm. Other
scholars focus on less obvious characteristics .... Others adopt a more
functional approach to distinguishing tortious from criminal activities.
Id. at 218.
184. For interesting and varied discussions of the tort-crime distinction, see
generally Symposium: The Intersection of Tort and Criminal Law, 76 B.U. L.
REV. 1 passim (1996); Symposium: Issues in the Philosophy of Law, 37 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1 passim (1995).
185. Tort law, for the most part, dictates that a person should not risk harm
whereas criminal law categorically prohibits specified acts (regardless of the
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remedies involved in tort and criminal law (monetary dam-
ages versus punitive measures);18 and (3) distinctions
between the enforcement mechanisms used to vindicate
those rights and apply the remedies (private law versus
public law). 87
Of the three, the distinction between the forms of the
prohibitions in tort and criminal law is the most relevant to
this discussion and arguably the most philosophically
weighty. The distinction between the private nature of tort
law and the public nature of criminal law is not an a priori
philosophical distinction.88 The private nature of tort law is
merely a contingent enforcement mechanism of liability
rules (like negligence).'89 One could easily imagine a system
harm produced). See Hurd, supra note 65, at 255 (arguing that negligence,
which forms the bulk of tort law, whether formulated as risk-taking or
unreasonableness, is ultimately a consequentialist concept whereas criminal
law embodies deontological categorical prohibitions). Others characterize the
divide as one between discontinuous prohibitions (torts) and categorical or
continuous prohibitions (crimes), see John Coffee, Does "Unlawful" Mean
"Criminal"?: Reflections of the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in
American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 193-94 (1991), or a divide between a system
which prohibits acts (crime) and a system which both prohibits acts and con-
cerns "conditionally permissible" acts (tort). See Marks, supra note 183, at 240.
186. See Coffee, supra note 185, at 194 ("Characteristically, tort law prices,
while criminal law prohibits.").
187. This argument dates as far back as William Blackstone. See Fletcher,
supra note 176, at 347 (observing that torts are private wrongs and crimes are
public wrongs). George Fletcher observes:
Blackstone had a point in identifying crimes as public wrongs and torts
as private wrongs. Both crimes and torts claim victims, however, the
victims' responses vary according to context. In criminal cases, the
victim responds by hoping that the government will apprehend and
successfully prosecute the offender. In tort disputes, the victim
responds by demanding compensation.
Id. at 347 (footnotes omitted).
188. George Fletcher observes that "it is unclear [from the public/private
distinction] what constitutes wrongdoing." Id.
189. While I characterize the public/private distinction as one of different
enforcement-government prosecution versus private law suit, George Fletcher
points to the existence of a different public/private distinction-the distinction
between acts that harm only the individual (torts) and acts that harm society
(crimes). Fletcher iterates Robert Nozick's argument that crimes create public
fear such that society is affected by "hearing reports" of crimes in a way they
are not affected by reports of tortious activity. Fletcher concludes, "Though the
public component is admittedly vague, there does seem to be something more to
crime than compensable harm to a single individual." George P. Fletcher, A
Transaction Theory of Crime?, 85 COLUM. L. REV 921, 925 (1985). This charac-
terization of the public/private distinction, however, seems flawed. First of all,
this argument reduces the "public" nature of crime merely to an empirical as-
2004] RIGHTING VICTIM WRONGS 485
in which the government enforced tort laws and distributed
awards to the victims, or acted through another regulatory
system. 9 ° Additionally, the fact that tort involves monetary
remuneration rather than punishment does not seem to be
of too much import.' As illustrated previously, criminal
sertion about how the public feels about certain crimes. A "public" event must
mean more than any event about which the public has a feeling. Second, the
empirical assumption that the public is affected only by reports of crimes, as
opposed to reports of tortious activity, is suspect. People generally react to
reports of bad things that they think will happen to them. Thus, reports of a
plane crash, due to the ordinary negligence of the pilot, which is hard to con-
ceive of as anything other than a tort, will inspire fear in thousands compelling
them not to fly. Likewise, a long-time happily married couple would likely not
feel fear at reports of domestic violence, but rather pity, similar to the pity we
feel for a paraplegic sky-diving victim, whose accident we do not believe will
happen to us.
190. This, by the way, may end up being more efficient, given the great costs
of the private court system. These costs and other concerns have led many
jurisdictions to adopt tort reform statutes. Critics argue that, in limiting liabil-
ity, tort reform ends up undercutting the prohibitory force of the law. See
Robert S. Peck et al., Tort Reform 1999: A Building Without a Foundation, 27
FLA. ST. L. REV. 397 (2000).
[T]he recent demands for widespread tort reform, while directing
attention to dissatisfaction with the tort system, tend to miss their
mark, since significant underdeterrence already exists. Thus proposals
that damage awards be capped, that limitations be placed on pain and
suffering and punitive damages, and that stricter evidence be required
for recovery should be rejected.
Id. at 440-41. In addition, there is also issue of the tenuous divide between pub-
lic and private law, see Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that the
use of state court to enforce private covenant constitutes state action), and the
historical lack of division between public and private law. See Carolyn B.
Ramsey, The Discretionary Power of 'Public" Prosecutors in Historical
Perspective, 39 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 1309, 1322 (2002) ("Colonists who arrived on
North American shores brought with them a tradition of allowing crime victims
to initiate and prosecute their own cases."); Martha Minow, Public and Private
Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARv. L. REV. 1229, 1234
(2003) ("some historical traditions permitted prosecutions initiated by private
parties . . ").
191. Kenneth Simons characterizes the compensation/punishment distinc-
tion as follows:
The tortfeasor is entitled to harm the victim so long as he pays for the
harm (with the expectation that this entitlement will induce him to
take optimal care), while the criminal is not entitled to harm the victim
even if the criminal is willing to pay for that harm.
Simons, supra note 70, at 273. Simons criticizes "price/prohibition and liability
rule/property rule explanations [as] inadequate" because they fail to account for
the deontological nature of tort law (including a deontological conception of
negligence). Id. Without committing to a deontological conception of tort law,
one can still criticize the above formulation of the tort/crime distinction. The
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law is concerned not only with sanctioning, but also with
victim compensation (both financial and emotional).
19 2
These dual goals are achieved through a variety of meas-
ures both incarceration-based and monetary. Likewise
through monetary awards, tort law is able to fulfill its dual
purpose of sanctioning negligent or intentionally harmful
behavior and compensating the injured party.
193
What seems to be the characteristic distinction between
criminal law and tort law is the structure of the prohibi-
tions. Eliminating the "fringes" of criminal law (strict
liability and negligence crimes) and tort law (punitive dam-
ages and intentional torts),' criminal law is composed of
statement is puzzling to me, perhaps because of the unclear nature of the word
"entitlement." Entitlement generally means a right to a benefit conferred by
law. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 387 (10th ed.) (defining
"entitlement" as "a right to benefits specified especially by law or contract"). It
is hard to conceive of the tort law as giving tortfeasors who are willing to pay
the right to injure victims. Rather, it is precisely because tortfeasors are not
entitled to injure victims that they must pay, that they are "liable." Thus,
Simon's follow-up statement, "this entitlement will induce [the tortfeasorl to
take optimal care" is confounding. How can it be that tort law both seeks to
entitle a paying tortfeasor to injure another and at the same time seeks to
induce him to take optimal care? It is certainly unusual to characterize a law
that sanctions behavior as entitling one to engage in the behavior as long as
they are willing to submit to the sanction. If an entitlement is nothing more
than a the right to commit a harm for which the harmer can afford to pay the
legal price, cannot one conceive of criminal law as entitling a criminal to commit
a crime so long as she is willing to submit to incarceration or a fine?
192. See Gruber, supra note 14, at 657 (referencing victim compensation
programs).
193. Complicating the compensation/punishment distinction even further
are the fringes of tort law and criminal law. Tort law contains clearly punitive
dimensions like punitive damages. Criminal law contains clearly compensatory
dimensions like sentences of restitution.
194. Many torts theorists would object strenuously to the contention that
intentional torts are "fringes." Thus, it appears to be a big cop-out to describe
criminal law and tort law as disparate by eliminating the fringes; however,
when engaging in such broad categorizations of the two bodies of law, it is
useful, if not necessary, to do so. Claire Finkelstein argues:
The sort of theoretical unity ... implicit in legal institutions is,
admittedly, approximate at best. Crimes of negligence and strict
liability remain relatively rare exceptions, and great expansion of these
forms of liability would signal that need to revise the account of
criminal liability. This would not show that we had been wrong about
the criminal law all along, but would suggest rather that the nature of
the institution had changed. Intentional torts provide the obvious
objection on the civil side, but there the answer to imperfection is
rather different. Either one must say that the institution of tort law
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specific categorical prohibitions, and tort law is about negli-
gence. This is evidenced by the fact that the bulk of tort law
centers on a general negligence prohibition, while criminal
law centers on categorically prohibited acts and has no
general negligence prohibition (although negligence is cer-
tainly the required intent in specified crimes):
With few exceptions, the 7000 prohibitions of the criminal law
function as agent-relative maxims . . . . [T]hey prohibit agents
from justifying their violation on consequentialist grounds.
Inasmuch as intentional torts are "civil crimes"-that is, crimes
upon which civil causes of action are parasitic-they occupy a
pocket of tort law that appears equally deontological in content.
But this pocket is a relatively small one. The bulk of tort law is
comprised of negligent and strict liability offenses. Although strict
liability, if purely applied, might be readily explained on
deontological grounds, few so-called strict liability causes of action
in tort law genuinely function to impose liability in the absence of
negligence.
While the system of criminal punishment can be justi-
fied by overarching deontological or utilitarian concerns,
the form of criminal prohibitions almost never requires the
actor to make consequentialist choices.19 Thus, criminal law
categorically prohibits the actor from doing "immoral"
things whereas tort law, through the general negligence
prohibition, requires the actor to engage in analyses of
future results of her behavior. In order to be non-negligent,
one must act reasonably or appropriately with regard to
risks of harm.197 In order to comport with categorical prohi-
bitions, the actor must refrain from the conduct, regardless
of the outcome or the empirical likelihood of certain out-
does not form a theoretical whole, or one must appeal to the lowest
common denominator....
Claire Finkelstein, The Irrelevance of the Intended to Prima Facie Culpability:
Comment on Moore, 76 B.U. L. REV. 335, 345-46.
195. Hurd, supra note 65, at 271-72.
196. In other words, the law may contain a categorical prohibition like, "Do
not drive drunk." Such a prohibition does not ask the actor to calculate the risks
of driving drunk, rather it absolutely prohibits drunk driving. This law,
however, may be justified on deontological grounds ("drunk drivers deserve
punishment") or consequentialist grounds ("drunk driving laws decrease motor
vehicle deaths.").
197. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 282 (1934) ("[Nlegligence is any
conduct.., which falls below the standard established by law for the protection
of others against unreasonable risk of harm.").
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comes.198 For this reason, much of negligence jurisprudence,
for example the famous Hand formula, concerns very conse-
quentialist cost-benefit analyses.'99 As a result, the concept
of consequentialist as opposed to deontological wrongdoing
is simply more palatable in tort law than in criminal law.
Contributory negligence properly belongs in a system that
requires actors to engage in risk analyses and not in a sys-
tem that categorically prohibits acts. For this reason,
contributory negligence principles are a better fit in tort
law than in criminal law.
Some theorists, however, would counter the contention
that contributory negligence is a consequentialist principle
that belongs only in tort law by characterizing negligence as
deontologically culpable. These theories purport to con-
struct deontological "risk-based" accounts of negligence,
which posit, in a nutshell, that unjustifiably risky behavior
is deontologically wrong, apart from any consequential
analysis. 200 Heidi Hurd responds to this account of negli-
gence, in part, as follows:
It is morally unacceptable to say that risking is deontologically
wrong, or that risking is deontologically culpable. Recall the
implications of identifying an act as a violation of a deontological
maxim: that act is categorically prohibited. If risks are
deontological wrongs, or if there is a deontology of culpability that
categorically prohibits one from taking certain risks, then risks
cannot be justified on consequential grounds.
20 1
Thus, negligence does not exhibit the deontological
character of categorical prohibitions. If negligence, which
consists of unreasonably risky behavior, were in fact deon-
tological, a risky act could not be made non-negligent by
198. See supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
199. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.
1947) (stating that an injury is not foreseeable if the costs of precautions to pre-
vent the injury exceed the costs of the injury multiplied by the probability of the
injury occurring if the precautions are not taken). Experts note that tort law
"permits judges to act as roving efficiency commissioners charged with the task
of identifying and achieving the cost-efficient mix of precaution and injury."
John C.P. Goldberg, Unloved: Tort in the Modern Legal Academy, 55 VAND. L.
REV. 1501, 1512 (2002).
200. Some argue that negligence is deontologically wrongful, apart from its
consequences, because negligent acts offend the (deontological) value of
reciprocity. See George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85
HARv. L. REV. 537, 548 (1972).
201. Hurd, supra note 65, at 264.
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appealing to its likelihood to produce overall good outcomes.
Tort law, however, does not operate this way. Consider the
way the tension between deontological and teleological doc-
trines is generally set forth-by moral dilemma. ' ° One can
determine if she is a deontologist if she would be unwilling
to kill an innocent person in order to prevent the killing (by
another) of ten innocents. As a result, a deontological
maxim dictating categorically that one ought not kill an in-
nocent, even if doing so produces the best overall results,
forces us to ignore our consequentialist intuitions."3
Negligence simply cannot be framed in this manner.
The maxim dictating that "one ought not be negligent" can-
not be tested by a consequentialist moral dilemma. For ex-
ample, generally speaking, speeding is a negligent act, per
se.' 4 Now, assume a person engaged in the seemingly negli-
gent behavior of speeding to the hospital in order to
promote the greater good of saving the life of a stabbing vic-
tim. It would make no sense to say that the person was
negligent in speeding the dying person to the hospital.
Rather, given the circumstances, the person's behavior was
in fact not unreasonably risky-it was not negligent at all.05
202. Many philosophical and even legal writings invoke the "moral di-
lemma" as a tool of testing theoretical leanings. See, e.g., The Case of the
Speluncean Explorers: A Fiftieth Anniversary Symposium, 112 HARV. L. REV.
1834, 1834-1923 (1999) (legal authors' analyses of the moral dilemma involving
several cave explorers who are forced to decide whether to sacrifice one of their
lives in order to save a greater number of lives).
203. Consequently, the "dilemma" is created.
204. See, e.g., Marks v. Mobil Oil Corp., 562 F. Supp. 759, 768 (D. Pa. 1983)
("In Pennsylvania, speeding violates the state motor vehicle code and is
negligence per se.").
205. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 cmt. a (1964):
There may be exceptional circumstances which make it reasonable to
adopt a course of conduct which involves a high degree of risk of
serious harm to others. While under ordinary circumstances it would
be reckless to drive through heavy traffic at a high rate of speed, it may
not even be negligent to do so if the driver is escaping from a bandit or
carrying a desperately wounded man to the hospital for immediately
necessary treatment, or if his car has been commandeered by the police
for the pursuit of a fleeing felon. So too, there may be occasions in
which action which would ordinarily involve so high a degree of danger
as to be reckless may be better than no action at all, and therefore both
reasonable and permissible. Thus one who finds another in a lonely
place, and very seriously hurt, may well be justified in giving him such
imperfect surgical aid as a layman can be expected to give, although it
would be utterly reckless for him to meddle in the matter if
professional assistance were available.
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The actor in this scenario would not be sanctioned by tort
law. Consider then, a true deontological maxim dictating
that one ought never speed. Because the maxim is
categorical, one could not violate it even in the name of
promoting greater utility."6 As a consequence, one could not
speed to the hospital even to save the life of a dying person.
The speeding defendant is therefore guilty, and it is no ex-
cuse that he sped to save the life of another. The result is
that whether the prohibition is characterized as one against
negligence (a teleological concept), or one against speeding
itself (a deontological maxim) affects whether our speeding
defendant will be sanctioned. Characterizing the prohibi-
tion against speeding as a subset of negligence is of obvious
philosophical import precisely because negligence is at its
core a consequentialist concept.
27
In addition, a contributory negligence principle is a bet-
ter fit in a system that is more explicitly concerned with re-
sults, like tort law. This is because tort law does not assess
culpability on the basis of the actor's breach of a prohibi-
tion, but rather on the actor's tendency to produce a harm-
ful result. Consequently, contributory negligence matters to
the extent that the plaintiff caused or contributed to the
harmful result. There can be little argument that tort law is
more results-oriented than criminal law. Generally, in tort
law, there is no suit for negligence that does not result in
harm,0 8 and the amount of compensation relates to the
206. Precisely because the speeding in this case is categorically prohibited
one could not violate it in the name of greater utility. See supra notes 195-97
(discussing the categorical nature of deontology).
207. Kenneth Simons asserts an interesting legal realist response to Hurd's
contention that negligence is teleological. He argues that "when courts employ
some form of a cost-benefit test of negligence, even when its deterrent efficacy is
doubtful, they are often relying upon a deontological norm such as the norm
that the injurer must show impartiality and consider the interests of potential
victims with at least as much regard as she considers her own interest."
Simons, supra note 70, at 280. While Simons may be correct that judges apply
negligence rules with an eye toward deontological values, this doesn't necessar-
ily mean that negligence, as a concept, is deontological. In a sense, Hurd's and
Simons's argument are like apples and oranges. Hurd is describing the prohibi-
tion against negligence, from a pure doctrinal standard, as teleological. Simons
is highlighting the multitude of factors that come into play (including deon-
tological values) when judges administer tort liability rules like negligence.
208. The practical reason for sanctioning only harmful negligence is that
ordinary negligence is such a common occurrence that regulating it through
penal laws, in the absence of an injury, would be administratively impossible.
First, it would require, at the very least, a governmental policing and regula-
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amount of damage, not the amount of negligence. 209 Moreo-
ver, tort law's emphasis on results attaches specifically to
negligence. For intentional or extremely reckless torts,
there are punitive damages to punish and deter tortfeasors
who engage in the most severe tortious activity.210 It is in
the area of negligent acts that tort law premises recovery on
injury.211 One may respond, however, that even criminal law
does not sanction negligence that fails to result in an injury:
[T]he criminal law is unconcerned with harm-less negligence.
Doesn't the law of attempt or some close relative of it, like reckless
endangerment, criminalize at least serious, albeit harm-less
negligence? The law of attempt itself certainly does not. In fact not
only does the law of attempt not reach seriously negligent
misconduct, it doesn't even reach knowing misconduct .... The
common law here seems far more reflective of the widely shared
intuition, that as a moral matter harm-less negligence is nearly
blamefree.
212
tory system for mere negligence. It would also necessitate an elaborate system
to ensure fair and impartial enforcement of such a sweeping provision. On the
other hand, sanctioning only harmful negligence makes law, in part, a function
of luck factors. Joel Feinberg argues, in the criminal law context, that the law
should not be premised on luck. "[Rieliance on luck in the law is a kind of arbi-
trariness... arbitrariness is a bad thing in a legal system, and.., it is incon-
sistent with the principle of proportionality to which most of us give regular lip
service." Feinberg, supra note 113, at 121. Barbara Herman responds that "to
say that luck brings arbitrariness into the law is not yet to offer an argument;
but it is only a consideration of some yet to be determined weight." Barbara
Herman, Feinberg on Luck and Failed Attempts, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 143, 144
(1995). Herman goes on to say:
Feinberg argues against those who would distinguish attempts from
successful actions on grounds of blameworthiness for harm caused. I
have suggested that our moral interest in attempts is not exhausted by
questions of blameworthiness for harm caused, and that some of the
other features of attempts that interest us may mark them for different
treatment in the criminal law.
Id. at 146.
209. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 cmt. a (1979) ("[Tlhe law of
torts attempts primarily to put an injured person in a position as nearly as
possible equivalent to his position prior to the tort. The law is able to do this
only in varying degrees dependent upon the nature of the harm.").
210. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979).
211. The victim who has encountered even gross recklessness but who does
not suffer harm can at most recover nominal damages. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 907 cmt. a (1979).
212. Katz, supra note 67, at 312.
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While it is true that in criminal law there is no doctrine
of attempted negligence, this does not necessarily mean
that the criminal law is wholly unconcerned with harmless
negligence. The criminal law includes a multitude of prohi-
bitions that contain no result element, for example, posses-
sory crimes. Many courts and legislatures have defined the
mens rea element in possession crimes as something like
negligence. That is, a person is guilty if she knew or should
have known that she possessed illegal items.213 This is one of
many examples of harmless negligence in criminal law.
It cannot, however, be denied that results matter in
criminal law, as exemplified by the fact that, in many cases,
completed crimes are punished more severely than
attempted crimes. 214 Theorists, however, struggle over the
propriety of imbuing results in criminal law with moral
significance. 215 In any case, in comparing criminal law to
tort law, what is undeniable is that in tort law, results mat-
ter more. Subsequently, contributory negligence finds justi-
fication in tort law precisely because tort law is about
consequential harms and results. Criminal law, on the
other hand, is more about categorically prohibited acts, re-
gardless of results. For this reason, it seems unfair to lessen
the liability of a defendant who has breached a categorical
prohibition merely because the victim acted negligently,
which amounts only to consequential fault.
Defenders of a moral account of negligence, however,
could argue that even if negligence is not deontologically
wrongful, it is consequentially wrongful. They would
213. See, e.g., State v. Gasta, No. C3-00-1728, 2001 WL 641590, at *4 (Minn.
Ct. App. June 12, 2001) ("To be convicted of first-degree sale of a controlled
substance, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant,
on one or more occasions within a 90 day period, unlawfully sold one or more
mixtures of a total weight of 10 grams or more containing cocaine, heroin, or
methamphetamine, and that the defendant knew or should have known that
the substance was a controlled substance.") (emphasis added).
214. For example, theft in the District of Colombia is punishable by a
maximum term of 10 years in jail. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3212 (2001).
Attempted theft is punishable by a maximum term of 180 days in jail. See D.C.
CODE ANN. § 22-1803 (2001).
215. It is this disparity between attempts and completed crimes, based on
luck factors, to which Feinberg objects as arbitrary. See Feinberg, supra note
113, at 119. Gary Watson, however, notes that luck factors are in fact incorpo-
rated into some of our moral feelings. He asks, "Suppose I am saved at sea by a
heroic and brilliant rescue attempt. While I would appreciate any efforts on my
behalf, I feel a special gratitude to those who saved my life." Gary Watson,
Closing the Gap, 37 ARIz L. REV. 135, 137 (1995).
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contend that the nonspecific victim liability defense is justi-
fied in blaming the imprudent victim because imprudence is
a consequential wrong, which is moral in nature.216 Propo-
nents of a moral conception of tort law make the following
argument: If tort law were just about amoral social order-
ing, then merely causing a harmful result should be suffi-
cient for liability. Instead, tort law involves some idea of
fault.217 In addition, an amoral explanation of tort law
seems to fail to account for feelings of moral reprehensibil-
ity against certain tortious behavior and aspects of tort law
like punitive damages. As a result, a comparative negli-
gence principle in criminal law, like in tort law, appropri-
ately accounts for the victim who has engaged in conse-
quentialist wrongdoing:
[T] ort law. . . appears to preoccupy itself primarily with the
concept of culpability that attaches to consequential wrongdoing,
that is, negligence, while criminal law concerns itself primarily
with the concepts of culpability that attach to deontological
wrongdoing, that is, specific and general intent. Put boldly and
bluntly, tort law appears to be about consequential wrongs, while
criminal law appears to be about deontological wrongs.218
There are, however, several responses to the argument
that consequential wrongdoing on the part of the victim is
"culpable" enough to absolve an intentional wrongdoer of
liability. First of all, one can contend that negligent tortfea-
sors are not people about whom we feel the same degree of
moral revulsion as criminals. 9 When one is sanctioned for
216. The argument is that narratives in both tort and criminal law cases
imbue certain negligent actors with immoral traits. Depraved-heart murder
doctrine, for example, describes the reckless killer in the most culpability laden
terms. He is someone with a "heart void of social duty, and fatally bent on mis-
chief." Mayes v. People, 106 Ill. 306 (1883), reprinted in CRIMINAL LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS, supra note 16, at 453.
217. See Simons, supra note 70, at 273:
[Some theories] imply that economic efficiency or a similar
consequentialist goal best explains and justifies tort law. Such a
utilitarian perspective fails to acknowledge the nonconsequentialist,
deontological basis of many elements of tort law. For example, it
cannot easily explain why tort law generally requires fault and abjures
strict liability, or why tort law focuses retrospectively on the victim's
right against the injurer.
218. Hurd, supra note 65, at 272.
219. This point, however, is debatable because, depending on the narratives
employed, criminals may be able to garner sympathy, for example battered
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negligence, it is not intuitively "fair" in the deontological
sense.2" Rather, sanctioning one for negligence is only fair
under a very consequentialist concept of fairness: That
those who produce disutility, even inadvertently, should
pay for it.
221
The limited nature of "morality" in negligence is also
reflected in many other aspects of tort law. First, the moral
import of tort judgments is quite different than the moral
import of criminal punishment. Under the law of tort, the
existence of simple negligence requires no more than the
negligent actor paying for the actual consequences of his
risk-taking. The negligent actor has to correct the disutility
he has produced. In addition, unlike the many categorical
prohibitions in criminal law that are graded, negligent
actors are treated differently in tort law, not according to
intent or conduct, but only according to outcomes.222 As a
result, some experts claim that criminal law "is organized
around the notion of moral culpability" whereas tort law
"has nothing to do with culpability" but "is designed to
promote social welfare by imposing duties on agents that
will help to organize their behavior prospectively in accor-
dance with various non-moral norms."
223
Regardless of whether negligence in general can cor-
rectly be characterized as consequentialist wrongdoing, it is
very difficult to describe a crime victim's contributory negli-
gence in the criminal law context as wrongful or immoral,
wives who kill, and tortfeasors may seem horrendous, for example the makers
of the Pinto.
220. Unless, in considering the behavior of the negligent party, it is invested
with some second-order deontological character like extreme indifference or
even purpose. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. In addition, there is
the argument that sanctioning negligent acts finds a deontological basis in reci-
procity. See Fletcher, supra note 176, at 548.
221. Many are comfortable with the idea that tortfeasors should pay for
disutility. This does not mean, however, that they would be comfortable charac-
terizing the payment as punishment.
222. George Fletcher observes;
An important cleavage does in fact run between torts and crimes. The
distinction is not expressed well as that between a nonmoral tort law
and a moral criminal law. For tort theories-both fault and strict
liability-might be based on solid moral principles. The cleavage is
better appreciated by taking note of the equal moral standing of all
torts as contrasted with the differential moral status of different
crimes.
Fletcher, supra note 189, at 924.
223. Finkelstein, supra note 194, at 344-46.
494 [Vol. 52
RIGHTING VICTIM WRONGS
whether consequentially or not. Contributory negligence,
unlike tortfeasor negligence, is "conduct which involves an
undue risk of harm to the person who sustains it. 2 4 Even if
ordinary negligence is a "consequential wrong,, 215 merely
increasing one's own risk of becoming a victim of an inten-
tional crime strains the boundaries of any tenable concept
of wrongdoing. When this is combined with the intention-
ally wrongful act of the defendant, it is very difficult to see
any fair grounds for lessening defendant liability. It is true
that one could simply define suboptimal self-protection as
immoral behavior," but this seems quite far removed from
ordinary intuitions regarding morality.2 Moreover, even if
the existence or nonexistence of imprudence could justify
treating two victims of the same crime differently under the
law, it does not appear to justify treating the defendants
who have intentionally harmed those victims differently.
The only way to morally sanction treating the defendants
differently is to make the hollow claim that a criminal who
preys on an imprudent victim is more moral than a criminal
who preys on a careful victim.
Let us assume, for the moment, that being careless
about your own risk of victimization is an immoral act.
Failing to invest in an alarm system, an omission that puts
one at greater risk of crime, may then be considered
immoral. ' Thus morality dictates that everyone ought to
224. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 cmt. b (1964).
225. See Hurd, supra note 65, at 272.
226. See Harel, supra note 155, at 1211-13.
227. See generally TUNICK, supra note 173.
228. Admittedly, it is not completely clear whether or not Harel believes
that failing to invest in an alarm system is "careless" behavior. However, he
carves out a very limited class of persons to which the comparative fault
principle in criminal law in inapplicable:
What is the proper context for implementing the equal costs model?
When is it fair to "reward" a less vulnerable victim and "punish" a
more vulnerable victim? It would seem, as discussed above, that the
involuntary vulnerability of a victim should not lead to granting her
lesser protection. Moreover, when the voluntary behavior generating
the vulnerability has unique social value, it deserves full protection. In
both cases, the equal protection model should determine the
distribution of protection. But if the victim's exposure to the risk is
both voluntary and of no special social value, the principle of equal
20041 495
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buy an alarm system. Such a construction of morality leads
to an incredibly disturbing view of the optimally moral soci-
ety:
Although in this day and age it is certainly prudent to take certain
precautions, the more we incorporate those precautions into the
criminal law, the smaller the range of acceptable behaviors
becomes. The ideal society becomes less a society where you do not
have to buy an alarm system or always lock your doors and more a
society where people are prisoners in their own homes.22 9
Indeed, even in tort law, contributory negligence less-
ens the defendant's liability only when the defendant acted
negligently rather than intentionally.23 ° Contributory negli-
gence simply does not provide a defense when the defen-
dant has intentionally breached a categorical prohibition.23'
Likewise, the current criminal law does not recognize a
contributory negligence defense to crimes.232 As a result, re-
sponding to the deontological objection by claiming that
blaming imprudent victims does capture the meaning of
just deserts is also ultimately an unsatisfying response.
D. Response 3: The Nonspecific Victim Liability Defense
Comports with Just Deserts Because It Sanctions
Wrongful Victim Behavior Rather Than Imprudent
Victim Behavior
My response to the deontological objection is that the
nonspecific victim liability defense does correctly capture
the concept of just deserts because it provides a defense
only when the victim has acted wrongfully. As a result, the
costs should govern the distribution of protection and the equal
protection principle should be disregarded.
Harel, supra note 155, at 1208.
229. Gruber, supra note 164, at 245.
230. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 481 (1965) ("The plaintiffs con-
tributory negligence does not bar recovery against a defendant for a harm
caused by conduct of the defendant which is wrongful because it is intended to
cause harm to some legally protected interest of the plaintiff or a third
persoh.").
231. See, e.g., Munoz v. Olin, 76 Cal. App. 3d 85 (1977) (no comparative
negligence defense to wrongful death action).
232. See 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 107 (noting the "general principle that
contributory negligence is not available as a defense to a criminal prosecution").
This is true even when the crime is a negligent crime. See State v. Scribner, 805
A.2d 812 (Conn. App. 2002).
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nonspecific victim liability defense must reject a definition
of "wrongful" victim conduct that includes mere negligence
with regard to risk of one's own victimization. 3' Premising
the defense on this type of negligence is antithetical to the
idea of "just desert." For reasons discussed above, impru-
dence regarding one's own safety generally does not and
should not constitute a moral wrong. Consequently, those
who engage in imprudent conduct should not be disadvan-
taged by the criminal the law. Similarly, committing a
crime against an imprudent victim is no less morally repre-
hensible generally (and perhaps even worse) than commit-
ting a crime against a careful victim.
234
This is a line in the sand drawn to respond to the deon-
tological criticism. The nonspecific victim liability defense
will not protect those defendants who commit a crime
against victims whose negligence lay only in failing to pro-
tect themselves adequately against intentional criminal
acts. There are, however, other lines that could be drawn.
For example, there is the issue of whether "wrongful" victim
conduct includes negligent conduct in other contexts. One
could imagine a crime victim whose negligence that poses a
risk of harm to others (rather than just to himself) causes
the defendant to commit a criminal act. Consider the fol-
lowing case involving an intentional defendant and a
grossly negligent victim.
233. In this sense, the victim liability defense is completely at odds with
contributory negligence, which defines, the victim behavior involved as
exclusively putting oneself at risk of harm. See supra note 182.
234. Vulnerable victims are often protected more by the criminal law than
non-vulnerable victims. Criminal protections offer increased penalties for those
who prey on the young, old, and disabled. See, e.g., Injury to a Child, Elderly
Individual, or Disabled Individual TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04 (Vernon 2003).
Even within the prevailing construction of vulnerability, there are negative
gender implications. In today's society, elderly victims of abuse are vulnerable
and worthy of extra protection, whereas battered women are responsible for
remaining in the relationship. See von Talge, supra note 1 at 131. Child sex
abuse victims are vulnerable and worthy of extra protection. See, e.g., 18
U.S.C.A. § 2243 (1998) (providing increased penalties for sexual abuse of a
minor). By contrast, female rape-by-fraud victims are ignorant and "should
have known better.:' In People v. Evans, 379 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1975), the defendant
falsely claimed that sex with him was a "therapy." The Court held:
It is not criminal conduct for a male to make promises that will not be
kept, to indulge in exaggeration and hyperbole, or to assure any
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The victim, Jon, is driving at a grossly negligent rate of
speed when he strikes and kills the defendant Carol's 6-
year-old son who was crossing the street. Carol, having ob-
served the killing, runs to Jon's car and hits him several
times. Carol is charged with aggravated assault.2 5
The moral reprehensibility that attaches to Carol's act
in the case above seems different instinctually than that
which attaches to the mugger who preys on lone joggers in
235. Notice that this example is quite distinct from the situation in which a
defendant, through negligent driving, kills a victim who was also driving negli-
gently. In this case, contributory negligence will not be a defense to vehicular
manslaughter, even though the defendant was merely negligent. In State v.
Scribner, 805 A.2d 812, 816 (Conn. App. 2002), for example, the defendant, a
police officer, in response to a "code 3" call (the highest emergency call),
proceeded to the scene of the crime. En route, the defendant officer sped
through a red light at an intersection, hitting the victim's car and killing her.
The defendant was convicted of negligent homicide. Under applicable tort stat-
utes governing the operation of emergency vehicles, the defendant could avail
himself of a contributory negligence defense. The defendant argued that it was
errbr for the trial court to prevent the defense from asserting contributory
negligence of the victim as a defense to the crime, especially given that he could
use the doctrine to prove that he was not civilly liable. The Connecticut
Appellate Court responded:
[Tihe general rule that contributory negligence is not a defense in a
criminal case applies in a negligent homicide case where ordinary
negligence is one of the required elements, unless such negligence on
the part of the decedent is found to be the sole proximate cause of his
death.
(citing State v. Pope, 313 A.2d 84, 85 (Conn. App. 1972)).
Perhaps this result seems unfair, as does, for example, the rule in Florida
that an intoxicated defendant can be convicted of DUI manslaughter even in the
absence of negligence on the part of the defendant and in the presence of negli-
gence on the part of the decedent. See State v. Hubbard, 751 So. 2d 552, 563
(Fla. 1999). This may emanate from prevailing retributivist sentiments that
lead to the conclusion that Scribner's category of negligence is not criminally
culpable. Perhaps the result seems unfair because the defendant was no more a
cause of death than the victim. The nonspecific victim liability defense does not
weigh in on whether contributory negligence should be a defense to negligent
crimes. This is because the defense requires that the victim's wrongful conduct
caused the defendant to engage in the prohibited act. In Scribner's case, even if
the victim's ordinary negligence (not with regard to risk of victimization but
risk of harm in general) is considered wrongful conduct, one could argue that
the conduct did not "cause" Scribner to commit the vehicular manslaughter.
Thus, the issue of the propriety of punishing simple negligence in or out of the
presence of contributory negligence is not addressed by the nonspecific victim
liability defense.
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the park.23 The question then is whether the requirement of"wrongful" victim behavior prevents the nonspecific victim
liability defense from applying to the above scenario. In
other words, must "wrongful" exclude all negligence and in-
clude only victims' intentional acts?
There are vast differences in types of negligence in
criminal law. Although there is no criminal liability for
general negligence, as there is in tort law, criminal law does
incorporate negligence in a variety of contexts.237 Some of
these contexts amount to no more than ordinary tort-like
negligence plus a specified result. For example, a run-of-
the-mill vehicular homicide statute criminally prohibits
negligent driving which results in a death." 8 In other
contexts, however, negligence may be combined with other
intents. A defendant may purposefully kill the victim, but
negligently (that is, unreasonably) believe that the victim
was threatening his life. '39 Similarly, a defendant may pur-
posefully have sexual intercourse with a victim, but negli-
gently believe that the victim gave consent.4 ° In the context
of vehicular homicide, the criminal defendant, like a tort
defendant, has acted unreasonably regarding risk of harm
to others (through operating her car in a certain manner).
In the self-defense and rape cases, the defendants inten-
tionally engaged in the prohibited conduct, but were unrea-
sonable regarding the existence of conditions that would
make the prohibited conduct legal under the specific
236. Jon was negligent regarding risk of harm to himself; however, the
essential difference between him and the imprudent jogger is he was also negli-
gent with regard to risk of harm to others.
237. See, e.g., supra note 235 (negligent manslaughter); supra note 213
(negligence as the required intent for possession of drug paraphernalia).
238. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 630 (2001) ("A person is guilty of
vehicular homicide in the second degree when [wihile in the course of driving or
operating a motor vehicle, the person's criminally negligent driving or operation
of said vehicle causes the death of another person.").
239. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.09(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
When the actor believes that the use of force upon or toward the person
of another is necessary for any of the purposes for which such belief
would establish a justification ... but the actor is reckless or negligent
in having such belief.., the justification afforded ... is unavailable in
a prosecution for an offense for which recklessness or negligence, as the
case may be, suffices to establish culpability.
240. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 554 A.2d 713, 718 (Conn. 1989) ("[T]he ques-
tion for us is whether the evidence is sufficient to prove that a reasonable




circumstances. These are just some of the ways in which
negligence operates in criminal law. Moreover, negligence
can take the form of consciously ignoring a risk or failing to
appreciate the existence of a risk, both of which may affect
moral sentiments differently. 4'
The result is a system in which, depending on the type
of negligence involved, the wrongfulness of the actor may be
more or less apparent. This is not only because the negli-
gence may constitute a consequential wrong, but also
because the so-called negligence of the victim is invested
with narratives of intentionality. Kenneth Simons distin-
guishes several different types of negligence in the criminal
law context: "[C]onscious recklessness (where the defendant
is aware of the risk), culpable indifference (where the de-
fendant shows a grossly inadequate concern for a risk or
harm), and simple negligence (where defendant, while neg-
ligent, is neither consciously reckless nor culpably indiffer-
ent)." 42 He argues that the character of the negligence
determines whether or not its criminal prohibition comports
with justice sentiments:
[Clulpable indifference, not conscious recklessness, is ordinarily
the appropriate threshold culpability for criminal liability on a
retributive theory. Simple negligence is ordinarily insufficient.
Although culpable indifference is highly correlated with conscious
recklessness, it is not coextensive; sometimes, a defendant who is
not aware of the relevant risk is nonetheless culpably indifferent
and properly subject to blame and punishment.
243
How then should the criminal law treat Carol's case?
Carol committed an intentional criminal act, and thus
under Simon's formulation is clearly morally culpable. Why
should Jon's negligence let her off the hook? For one thing,
Jon's negligence was the cause of Carol's culpable act. This
241. The Model Penal Code, for example, premises liability for reckless
crimes on "consciously disregard[ing] a substantial and unjustifiable risk."
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Other laws define
recklessness as being unaware of such a risk. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Welansky, 55 N.E.2d 902, 910 (Mass. 1944) ("[Elven if a particular defendant is
so stupid [or] so heedless ... that in fact he did not realize the grave danger, he
cannot escape the imputation of wanton or reckless conduct in his dangerous
act or omission .... ).
242. Kenneth W. Simons, Culpability and Retributive Theory: The Problem




causal connection is of moral importance deontologically
because the fact that Carol's behavior was caused by a
"bad" act of Jon can show that she does not "deserve" to be
treated the same way as someone who acts criminally for
other reasons.2" Whenever an intentionally harmful act is a
response to negligence, however, a proportionality problem
arises. Some may feel that Carol's purposeful assault of
John is disproportional because John did not intend to hit
and kill her daughter-it was merely a product of his negli-
gence.245 My guess, however, is that many others would feel
that Carol's reaction is completely excusable because even
though John was merely negligent, his actions produced
such great harm.246 Whether or not Carol should be pun-
ished to the full extent of the law, punished to a lesser
extent, or exculpated depends on particular conceptions of
the culpability of negligence, the role of harm and results,
and the influence of passion. The fourth part of the nonspe-
cific victim liability test allows the factfinder to weigh the
actions of the victim and the reactions of the defendant in
determining to what degree punishment should be miti-
gated.247 The nonspecific victim liability defense will not,
however, necessarily provide a concrete answer to, for
example, how much weight should be given to the extent of
the harmful results produced by the victim.
In the end, appealing to the nonspecific victim liability
defense's self-limitations is the best way to respond to the
deontological objection. Because of the requirement that the
victim behave "wrongfully," the defense avoids reducing
defendant liability on the ground that the victim did not
protect himself adequately against crime. As to other forms
of victim negligence that pose harm to others, they may or
may not amount to exculpating or mitigating factors,
depending on the particular nature the negligence, whether
244. See Gruber, supra note 14, at 715 ("In terms of the defendant, the
premise of the victim liability defense is that those who merely respond to
harmful victim behavior by committing crimes are less culpable than those who
act criminally for other impermissible reasons.").
245. Indeed, people may believe, like Simons, that Jon's actions were not
culpable or as culpable as an actor with a higher degree of intention.
246. When put in the context of Carol's great suffering at the loss of her
daughter, they will find her acts to be either justified or at least excused. Many
may base this idea of excuse on the existence of emotional factors that caused
Carol to act from diminished capacity. Others, however, would likely find that
hitting Jon is a reasonable response to the circumstances.
247. See Gruber, supra note 14, at 709 (discussing the balancing test).
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other mental states are involved, and the likelihood and
severity of the resulting harm. Once the victim's negligent
or intentional conduct is established as wrongful, it must
still be weighed against the actions of the defendant in
determining whether the defendant should be exculpated or
her punishment mitigated. Through this process, the non-
specific victim liability defense adequately defines the
boundaries of what it means to "deserve" punishment.
Consequently, the deontological concerns with the
defense require a refined definition of "wrongfulness." Re-
tributivist sentiments compel the defense to comport with
ideals of just deserts. Any fair concept of just deserts must
reject a system that negates defendant liability based on
victim imprudence, that is, the victim putting herself at
risk of crime. As a result, "wrongful" victim behavior cannot
include behavior that is merely contributorily negligent.
This is not necessarily to say that no negligence on the part
of the victim can be a predicate for the defense. Some negli-
gent acts pose risks, not just to the actor, but also to others.
Such acts, when they cause great harm, could be seen as"wrongful" behavior that should lessen the liability of the
defendant who responds to the behavior.
III. RESPONDING TO CONSEQUENTIALIST AND EXPRESSIVIST
CONCERNS
A. Consequentialist Critiques
Deterrence theorists would likely criticize the nonspe-
cific victim liability defense on two levels. First, the defense
lessens the efficacy of criminal laws in deterring society
members from committing crimes.248 Second, the defense
lessens deterrence with regard to the individual defendant
asserting the defense. Turning to the first deterrence objec-
tion, the argument is that on a society-wide level, the
defense is not deterrent because it gives criminals an addi-
tional avenue for defending against a conviction, making it
less likely they will be punished.249 This in turn lessens the
248. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text (discussing deterrence
theory).
249. This argument has been used not only to counter specific criminal
defenses but also procedural measures like the exclusionary rule. The argument
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efficacy of criminal prohibitions in general because poten-
tial criminals will know that they can "beat the system" by
focusing on victims' conduct.
One can respond to the deterrence criticism by appeal-
ing to deontology or consequentialism. Focusing on the
deontological response first, the argument is that the victim
liability defense is fair and therefore should be imple-
mented even if it reduces deterrence.25 ° One can analogize
the victim liability defense to self-defense, which does carve
out an exception to criminal laws and in turn may slightly
reduce their efficacy, but is nonetheless warranted because
it defines the boundaries of just deserts. In addition, one
can respond to the deterrence criticism by meeting the
empirical objection on its own terms and arguing that the
defense will not, in fact, reduce the efficacy of criminal
punishment in general. Since the nonspecific victim liability
defense is narrowly tailored, because it excludes certain vic-
tims and defendants from its protective ambit, it is specific
enough not to undermine the bulk of the criminal law,
much like self-defense does not undermine the bulk of
homicide prohibitions.25' Finally, one can point out conse-
quential benefits of the defense by contending that the non-
specific victim liability defense, like self-defense, actually
deters bad behavior generally by encouraging would-be
wrongful victims to refrain from engaging in wrongful be-
havior."' As with tort law, the analysis is that victim liabil-
is that these measures lessen the efficacy of criminal prohibitions and increase
crime. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969) (refusing to
extend the exclusionary rule to evidence illegally seized from a co-defendant be-
cause "we are not convinced that the additional benefits of extending the exclu-
sionary rule to other defendants would justify further encroachment upon the
public interest in prosecuting those accused of crime").
250. Recall that deontological principles like fairness limit overly harsh
criminal sanctions created in the name of deterring crime. See supra notes 66-
67 and accompanying text.
251. See George P. Fletcher, Domination in the Theory of Justification and
Excuse, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 553, 556-58, 567-71 (1996) (discussing the narrow
nature of self-defense).
252. Utilitarian arguments are often employed in this context to justify laws
that affect the incentives of those injured by others. This occurs most often in
the tort context. See, e.g., Kaczmarek v. Allied Chemical Corp., 836 F.2d 1055,
1058 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that comparative negligence has a "positive ...
effect on the incentives of potential victims to take care"). But it also happens in




ity, like plaintiff liability, could affect victim incentives in a
maximally efficient way.
The second critique can be lodged by the deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation schools of consequential-
ist thought. It consists of the argument that the individual
defendant who successfully asserts the defense will not,
herself, be deterred from future crimes, given the opportu-
nity for rehabilitation, or removed from society. Again, the
response to this contention can be articulated on two levels.
First, from a deontological standpoint, if it is fair to reduce
or eliminate liability for this particular defendant, incar-
ceration solely as a means to incapacitation, deterrence, or
rehabilitation is objectionable. If it were not so, an easily
rehabilitated murderer could serve, say, a year in jail,
whereas a criminally-inclined shoplifter could spend a life-
time in jail. Now, the consequentialist could simply respond
that this is not a bad thing. The precise reason that there
are reforms like repeat offender laws and civil commitment
of sex offenders is that the law does embrace the idea of de-
tention, not based solely on the individual crime committed,
but rather based on the future danger the defendant poses
to society.2"'
Even the most die-hard consequentialists, however,
may be persuaded by the following empirical response. The
reason why concerns over the negative effects of the defense
on the individual defendant are misplaced is that the non-
specific victim liability defense is constructed in such a way
as to make sure those defendants who fall within the ambit
of the defense acted uncharacteristically because of unique
circumstances created by the victim. Therefore, these
defendants are not likely to repeat the criminal behavior.255
As such, they do not need to be deterred from committing
future crimes since their criminal behavior only came about
253. Efficiency arguments, which are a specific subset of utilitarian thought,
play a central justificatory role in tort law. From the Hand formula to modem
law and economics, tort law has been identified jointly with cost-benefit analy-
ses. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text (discussing predictive
trend in criminal law).
255. See Gruber, supra note 14, at 718-26 (analyzing the predisposition
prong of the defense).
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because of extraordinary circumstances.256 This argument,
that the nonspecific victim liability defense is narrowly tai-
lored, also shows that the defendants to whom the defense
applies do not need to be incapacitated or rehabilitated (or
at least not to the same extent as "ordinary" criminals).
25 7
There may, however, be cases in which a nondisposed de-
fendant overreacts to wrongful victim behavior in a way
that demonstrates her dangerousness. In such cases, the
fourth prong of the nonspecific victim liability defense
allows the jury to balance the victim's behavior and the de-
fendant's response and assess a level of punishment appro-
priate to the amount of dangerousness exhibited by the
defendant.258
The next set of consequentialist critiques come from the
redistributionists. They would posit that the nonspecific
victim liability defense is problematic because it prevents
the criminal justice system from making the crime victims
"whole.2 19 Pain is not redistributed to the defendant, who
caused the harm, and closure is not given to the victim. The
first response to this criticism is to question the propriety of
redistribution in criminal law. As noted in Part I, there are
many reasons why the criminal law should not be in the
business of distributing pain and closure.26 °
Assuming, however, that redistribution is a legitimate
or desirable goal of punishment, there are deontological and
256. This may be achieved by setting forth criteria, for example, a lack of
predisposition requirement, which separates those who act criminally only in
extraordinary, artificial situations from those who act criminally by nature:
A predisposition inquiry focuses on when the defendant made the
decision to commit the criminal act, which hopefully will provide a
reliable indication of whether she made that decision of her own free
will. This, in turn, is presumed to be evidence of whether the defendant
poses a danger to society .... The most compelling justification for this
distinction is that the principal purpose of a legal penalty is to protect
society from those who would harm it, not from those whose wrongful
conduct consists solely of a failure to exercise self-restraint [in an
extraordinary circumstance].
Kenneth M. Lord, Entrapment and Due Process: Moving Toward a Dual System
of Defenses, 25 FLA. ST. L. REv. 463, 474-75 (1998).
257. Arguably a person who uncharacteristically responded to wrongful
victim behavior and is not predisposed to crime does not need social re-ordering.
See supra notes 90-91 (discussing rehabilitiation).
258. See Gruber, supra note 14, at 726-31 and accompanying text.
259. See id. at 656 n.48 (discussing closure and the victims' rights
movement).
260. See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
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empirical responses to the criticism. Deontologically
speaking, when the elements of the nonspecific victim li-
ability defense are met, it is not fair to distribute pain to
the defendant and closure to the victim. Even if redistribu-
tive goals justify punishment where both parties are inno-
cent, for example, in the case of strict liability crimes where
the victim is innocent but the defendant also had an inno-
cent intent, redistribution should not necessarily justify
punishment when the victim is the sole wrongful actor.
Because the nonspecific victim liability defense is con-
structed so that it is clear that the victim has committed a
wrong whereas the defendant has not necessarily (although
the defendant has committed a tangible harm), the noncon-
sequentialist principle of fairness comes in to limit the
redistributive theory from dictating that the injured party
deserves closure (through punishment of the injurer).
Fairness dictates that a morally reprehensible victim
should not be able to garner the panoply of victims' rights,
and the redistributive power of the government, against a
nondisposed defendant who merely responded to the
wrongdoing. In essence the wrongful actor does not deserve
to be restored by the defendant:
When a person suffers a loss, it may be the fault of another person
or it may be no one's fault; and as we have seen, the nature of
desert differs in the two cases. There is, however, a third
possibility: the loss or injury may be his own fault. In that case,
though he may well be entitled to help, we should be loath to say
that he deserved it; for we do not as a rule compensate people for
their folly or indolence and even when we do, it is not because we
think they deserve it.26
261. In other words, redistribution is proper only when the defendant is
more culpable than the victim or, at least, as culpable as the victim. This pre-
vents a wrongful victim from recovering from a non-wrongful defendant. Unlike
criminal law, tort law more explicitly embraces redistributive goals. See Tsachi
Keren-Paz, Egalitarianism as Justification: Why and How Should Egalitarian
Concerns Shape the Standard of Care in Negligence Law?, 4 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES IN L. 275, 275-76 (2003) ("A correct and full understanding of the
egalitarian concern and the tort of negligence requires a conclusion that the
normative evaluation of one's action as negligent or not cannot be separated
from the distributive results that this action entails."). Even in tort law, how-
ever, contributory and comparative negligence principles dictate that the
plaintiff can recover only if she is less at fault than the defendant.
262. FEINBERG, supra note 51, at 75-76.
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To put the response in a consequentialist framework,
when a wrongful victim is rewarded a bad result has
occurred. Feminists, for example, express disdain for
treating decedent abusive husbands as innocent victims in
cases where battered wives kill their husbands.6 3 Indeed,
the most restorative-minded reformers would be hard
pressed to argue that a wrongful victim who has been
harmed due to his own wrongful actions deserves compensa-
tion.
To sum up, appealing to the particular framework of
the nonspecific victim liability defense provides the re-
sponse to the consequentialist critiques. To the extent that
the defense is tailored to include only those defendants who
are not criminally-inclined, the defense is able to overcome
deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation concerns. Be-
cause the defense defines the victim conduct relevant to the
defense as "wrongful" conduct, it is able to withstand conse-
quentialist concerns over redistribution and closure.
B. Expressivist Concerns
These concerns merit only a brief discussion, as it is un-
clear whether the expressivist would object to the defense
or the nature of the objection. Here it is important to recall
that the expressivist argues that any philosophical account
of criminal law must account for the condemnatory function
served by the law.2' The difficulty is that it is unclear
whether expressivism is itself a ground for criminal pun-
ishment or if expression is merely an ancillary aspect of the
government's execution of penal laws based on other philo-
sophical grounds. In addition, if expressivism is the reason
why the state punishes, what should or should not be
included in that expression?265 Because of these nuances, it
is difficult to determine the exact nature of an expressivist
263. During a hearing on a victims' rights resolution, the NOW Legal
Defense Fund issued a statement that "constitutional guarantees afforded to
criminal defendants are just as important-if not more-to battered women
accused of striking back because batterers can use the amendment to retaliate."
Lynne Henderson, Revisting Victim's Rights, 1999 Utah L. Rev. 383, 404 n.81
(citing A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Protect Victims of Crime:
Hearings on S.J. Res. 6, 105TH CONG. 24 (1997) (statement of NOW Legal
Defense Fund)).
264. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 130-41.
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critique. It seems that the expressivist would say that the
defense is not good if it embodies value judgments that the
punishing authority ought not express (for example, that
paramour killings are justified); but it is good if it reflects
value judgments that the punishing body ought to express
(for example, that paramour killings are unjustified). 266
Again, however, this just begs the question of what ought to
be expressed. Victim Wrongs makes the argument that the
current law, in the absence of the nonspecific liability
defense often manifests morally inappropriate value judg-
ments, much in the way that, according to Feinberg,
Texas law on paramour killings involved morally incorrect
ideology.268 In fact, Victim Wrongs specifically criticizes the
tendency of provocation law, in its current form, to lead to
the exculpation of men who kill their wives for attempting
to leave them and shows how the defense improves this
legal regime.269 Consequently, to the extent that the victim
liability defense more accurately expresses correct moral
judgments, it serves as a vehicle for the state to exercise its
condemnatory function in an appropriate manner.
CONCLUSION
The goal of this project has been to reconceptualize vic-
tim liability in the criminal law and create a defense that
responds to the privatization trend in criminal law, forms a
more coherent doctrine than the existing collection of spe-
cific victim liability defenses, and adequately addresses
266. FEINBERG, supra note 51, at 103.
267. See Gruber, supra note 14, at 680-82.
268. FEINBERG, supra note 51, at 103.
269. Gruber, supra note 14, at 681-82:
There can be little doubt that those men who kill women for
attempting to leave them, though moved to passion, are so moved
because of their internalization of chauvinistic and oppressive beliefs
concerning the proper role of women. Thus, the problem with
provocation law is that it does not provide an adequate mechanism for
judging which acts on the part of the victim the law should permit to
excuse the defendant in killing. The question should not be whether
the provocation at issue was in fact adequate to move the defendant to
kill, but whether the victim behavior is wrongful enough that the law
will permit people to indulge their passions and kill based on that
behavior. In this sense, provocation law can be normative because it
does more than merely reflect the passions of defendant. Rather, it
informs the defendant, and thereby society, as to what may and what
may not legitimately arouse passion.
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philosophical sentiments about the purpose of criminal
punishment. The first part of the project, Victim Wrongs,
examines the role of the modern crime victim, explains how
the nonspecific victim liability defense reforms and refines
current victim liability law, and explores each of the four
requirements of the defense. This article has discussed the
nonspecific victim liability defense in the context of penal
theory and has responded to both deontological and conse-
quentialist concerns.
The nonspecific victim liability defense, as Part II ex-
plains, can comport with deontological concerns over just
deserts. The defense is compatible with retributivism be-
cause the parameters of the defense set forth the bounda-
ries of what it means to act without culpability. Much like
the current criminal law regime treats a person who acts in
self-defense as justified, a person who complies with the
requirements of the nonspecific victim liability defense
simply does not deserve to be punished or deserve to be
punished to the same degree as someone who did not com-
ply with the dictates of the defense. In order for this argu-
ment to be persuasive, an examination of the precise
parameters of the defense was required. In order to comport
the defense with sentiments of just deserts, a clear defini-
tion of "wrongful" victim behavior became expedient. What
necessarily must be excluded from that definition of
"wrongful" victim conduct, is victim conduct that merely
puts the victim at risk of an intentional criminal attack.
Such imprudence is not "wrongful" in the deontological
sense. As a result, the nonspecific victim liability defense
must be completely distinct from tort doctrines of victim
liability like contributory and comparative negligence. Not
all victim negligence, however, must be excluded from the
definition of "wrongful" behavior. The defense draws a
sharp distinction between negligence as to risk of one's own
victimization, which is not wrongful, and negligence that
poses a risk of harm to others, which may be considered
culpable behavior, depending on the circumstances. The
result is that, like intentionally wrongful behavior, some
negligent or reckless victim behavior is wrongful and can be
a predicate for the nonspecific victim liability defense. The
fourth prong of the defense allows the gravity of the victim's
behavior to be weighed against the gravity of the defen-




Part III of the article responded to utilitarian concerns
that the defense would produce disutility by lessening
deterrence, failing to incapacitate or rehabilitate the dan-
gerous, and failing to distribute closure to victims. The
response to these concerns also lay largely in an
examination and explication of the parameters of the de-
fense. By incorporating a lack of predisposition requirement
and a balancing test, the nonspecific victim liability defense
applies to a class of defendants that are not dangers to soci-
ety and do not require deterrence, rehabilitation, or inca-
pacitation. Moreover, because of the requirement of "wrong-
fulness," the defense ensures that the victims who
participate in restorative programs and receive victims'
rights fit better into the presupposed archetype of the
blameless victim. Finally, the defense aids the criminal law
in meeting its expressive functions by allowing the law to
punish in an appropriate condemnatory fashion.
In the end, this project has recharacterized criminal law
in a more transactional way so that criminal doctrines can
account adequately for the relative moral culpability of all
the parties to an injurious event. With the rise of the
victims' rights movement, victims have gained unprece-
dented power in the criminal law, which in turn under-
scores the need for a more comprehensive assessment of
their roles in criminal offenses. The nonspecific victim
liability defense is a coherent and fair legal mechanism that
allows the law to assess the culpability of the defendant in
the context of the victim's wrongful conduct. Because the
defense is based on wrongful rather than merely imprudent
victim behavior, it will not result in the victim-blaming
miscarriages of justices feared by deontologists. Moreover,
the parameters of the defense respond adequately to conse-
quentialist concerns. Subsequently, the nonspecific victim
liability defense equitably balances the competing interests
of victims and defendants and creates a legal regime that
furthers both philosophical ideals regarding punishment
and society's interest in a fair and consistent administra-
tion of justice.
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